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NOTE
ROMANO V. OKLAHOMA: THE




The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires
that punishments not be "cruel and unusual."' In 1972, the landmark
case of Furman v. Georgia2 extended the Eighth Amendment to defend-
ants in death penalty trials by protecting them from "arbitrary and capri-
cious" sentencing.' This protection, however, did not abolish capital
punishment. In fact, the Supreme Court has affirmed capital punishment
repeatedly.4 Although the death penalty appears to be entrenched for
the foreseeable future, the Supreme Court still struggles to determine
which sentencing procedures are constitutionally permissible.'
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments in-
flicted." Id.
2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
3. Id. at 238.
4. See, e.g., Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding Texas'
three question capital sentencing statute); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (upholding Georgia's capital sentencing scheme). Given the current climate,
there is little likelihood that the Court will abolish the death penalty. Michael Mello, An-
other Attorney For Life, in FACING THE DEATH PENALTY 81, 87 (Michael L. Radelet ed.,
1989); see also JAN GORECKI, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 112-13 (1983) (explaining how Gregg
v. Georgia paved the way for death penalty to continue). In fact, the United States is the
only Western industrial nation to continue to execute criminals. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING &
GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 3 (1986); Ved P.
Nanda, Recent Developments in the United States and Internationally Regarding Capital
Punishment-An Appraisal, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 523, 523 (1993). Yet, a recent study
showed the United States is currently the most murder-prone of all the industrial countries.
Pierre Thomas, Southern States Top List of Highest Murder Rates, WASH. POST, Feb. 2,
1995, at A16.
5. Mello, supra note 4, at 87-88; see J. Mark Lane, "Is There Life Without Parole?": A
Capital Defendant's Right to a Meaningful Alternative Sentence, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 327,
329 (1993) (recognizing that the Supreme Court's focus has been on procedures and cir-
cumstances of imposing the death penalty); Robert P. Gritton, Comment, Capital Punish-
ment: New Weapons in the Sentencing Process, 24 GA. L. REV. 423, 423 (1990) (noting that
1307
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 44:1307
The current death penalty sentencing process provokes a wide range of
arguments and opinions from judges,6 legislators,7 commentators,8 and
the general public.' The public not only supports the death penalty, but
often criticizes the length of time it takes to impose this punishment. 1°
the Supreme Court has struggled to define the limits of the death penalty since its reaffir-
mation of capital punishment in 1976). Since Furman, the Supreme Court has focused on
procedural safeguards to avoid arbitrary application of the death penalty and guide the
jury process during sentencing. Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2009 (1994); Saw-
yer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1992). Currently, most capital trials consist of two stages.
Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37
AM. U. L. REV. 513, 519 (1988). The first stage is the traditional determination of guilt or
innocence. Id. The second stage is the penalty stage, which is essentially a separate pro-
ceeding on the issue of sentencing. Id.
6. See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1127-28 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(disagreeing with Justice Blackmun's belief that the death penalty cannot be constitution-
ally administered). Disputes over the death penalty arise between federal and state courts
and within the Supreme Court itself. Michael D. Hintze, Attacking the Death Penalty: To-
ward a Renewed Strategy Twenty Years After Furman, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 395,
419-20 (1993); see Gerald F. Uelmen, Review of Death Penalty Judgments by the Supreme
Courts of California: A Tale of Two Courts, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 237, 238 (1989) (compar-
ing two different eras of the California Supreme Court's response to capital punishment).
7. See Don Aucoin & Peter J. Howe, House Votes Down Death Penalty Bill, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 27, 1994, at 1 (demonstrating the differences among Massachusetts legislators
as they voted 86 to 70 to not reinstate capital punishment).
8. See, e.g., Symposium on Capital Punishment, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB.
POL'Y 1 (1994) (publishing a diverse series of articles on capital punishment); Symposium,
20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7 (1992) (containing a series of articles on capital punishment).
9. One faction of the public seeks to abolish the death penalty. See GORECKI, supra
note 4, at 87-95 (describing the abolitionist movement). Another faction focuses on proce-
dural fairness to the capital defendant. Id. at 115-17 (explaining the movement to improve
the capital sentencing criminal justice system);
Victims' rights groups, however, routinely push to speed up the death penalty process
and view appeals as a "stalling tactic." Susan Warren, Taking Offense at Death-Row De-
fense, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 7, 1993, at 20A; see also Jerry Urban, Killer Put to Death,
Hous. CHRON., Jan. 17, 1995, at 13A, 16A (showing different views of the public regarding
the execution of mentally retarded defendants).
10. Ronald Brownstein, Capital Punishment Held Up as Life or Death Campaign Is-
sue, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1994, at A5. A Gallup Poll revealed that 75% of Americans
supported the death penalty for murderers. Id. In addition, if life without parole was an
option, 60% still supported the death penalty. Id. Surveys demonstrated that the underly-
ing reason for the public support is the view that the death penalty is "just punishment" for
the level of offenses criminals sentenced to death commit. Id. California Governor Pete
Wilson endorsed this viewpoint when he declared that voters "regard the death penalty as
justice." Id. Contra Joe Davidson, Death-Penalty Support Found Not Firm, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 19, 1993, at B2. The Death Penalty Information Center reported that support for the
death penalty softens when an effective alternative to capital punishment is offered. Id. In
addition, one commentator contended that as the number of executions increased, the
level of public acceptance for the death penalty decreased. Nancy Levit, Expediting Death:
Repressive Tolerance and Post-Conviction Due Process Jurisprudence in Capital Cases, 59
UMKC L. REV. 55, 71 (1990).
Another concern of the public is delay in carrying out the death penalty. See infra note
12 and accompanying text (discussing public demand for expedited death sentences). For
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This view coincides with the public's fear of rising crime rates and unpro-
voked violence. 1 As a result, death penalty proponents want to expedite
the death sentences of those defendants sentenced to death. 2 Recently,
politicians heeded this message and the death penalty ripened into a
political symbol.' Capital punishment played a prominent role in recent
example, the killer of Mark Alan Frederick has been on death row for nineteen years.
Tony Mauro, Death Penalty Becoming "Real": Four Could Be Executed this Week, USA
TODAY, Dec. 7, 1994, at 3A. Frederick's father complained that for him it is "cruel and
unusual punishment to go through 19 years .... [t]he laws become a joke if we don't
enforce them." Id. (quoting Pat Teer). Another criticism in capital murder cases is the
extreme cost involved and the lack of judicial resources. See Charles L. Lindner, Capital
Cases are Crippling State Courts, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 5, 1993, at Fl (estimating the
cost to be between $3.5 million and $4.5 million for each defendant). One author, while
calling for the abolition of the death penalty, reported that the California Supreme Court
spends half its time on death penalty cases. Id. In addition, Florida estimated it costs $3.2
million to execute each defendant, while a New York study calculated that each death
penalty trial would cost $1.4 million. Robert L. Spangenberg & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Capi-
tal Punishment or Life Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations, 23 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
45, 58 (1994); see Richard Moran & Joseph Ellis, Price of Executions is Just Too High,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1986, at B1 (explaining the high monetary cost of death penalty
cases).
11. Washington Wire, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 1994, at Al. The Wall Street Journal re-
ported that a Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll indicated that 93% of Americans be-
lieved that dealing with crime should be "an absolute priority" for President Clinton and
Congress. Id. In addition, that same poll indicated strong support for making more crimes
eligible for the death penalty. Id. Another author acknowledged that recent polls showed
vast numbers of Americans call crime their greatest concern. Richard Lacayo, Lock 'Em
Up, TIME, Feb. 7, 1994, at 50, 52; see also Jill Smolowe, Danger in the Safety Zone: As
Violence Spreads into Small Towns, Many Americans Barricade Themselves, TIME, Aug. 23,
1993, at 29.
12. Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex Procedure for a Simple
Process, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (1993). Richard Dieter, a member of the Death
Penalty Information Center, a capital punishment opposition group, has emphasized that
the public is impatient for more executions. Carol J. Castaneda, Texas Murderer Wins a
Reprieve, USA TODAY, Mar. 15, 1995, at 2A. In addition, the public demonstrated this
impatience in the last election by voting on candidates who "promised to push the death
penalty." Id. (quoting Richard Dieter); see Joseph W. Bellacosa, Ethical Impulses from the
Death Penalty: "Old Sparky's" Jolt to the Legal Profession, 14 PACE L. REV. 1, 14 (1994)
(acknowledging that the public's attitude "seems to be let's just get on with [the execu-
tions] and get them over with"); David A. Kaplan, Catch-22 at the High Court, NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 11, 1994, at 68 (explaining the public's exasperation about the high number of death
row inmates versus the low number who get executed each year); see also Gaynell Terrell
& Bryan Denson, County Executions Deadly Distinction, Hous. POST, Dec. 11, 1994, at A-
43, A-45 (reporting a spokesman for death penalty opponents "fears public passion for
revenge has speeded the process").
13. Jason Berry, Is Justice Forgiving?, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 15, 1993, at 1J.
Judges, governors, and other politicians "fear the soft-on-crime stigma." Id. at 11J.
Michael Radelet, a leading authority on capital punishment, explained that commutation
of death sentences by state governors is not an element in the modem era of the death-
sentencing process. Id. at 1J. He reasoned that the politicians have "an erroneous percep-
tion that public opinion would not tolerate commutation. It's the Willie Horton syn-
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gubernatorial elections when pro-death penalty politicians rallied in sup-
port of capital punishment. 14 Furthermore, decisions by the Supreme
Court reflect the current pro-death penalty atmosphere. 15 After initially
protecting the rights of capital defendants, the Supreme Court retreated
in the early 1980s and began to favor expediting the death penalty.' 6
Despite the current pro-death penalty environment, the defendant on
trial facing the death penalty should not be forgotten. 17 Because "death
is different," courts must emphasize reliability and fairness towards the
capital defendant. 18 When a state sentences a defendant to death, it is
drome." Id. Ohio Senator Howard Metzenbaum reported that "[w]e seem almost
completely preoccupied with the question of how to speed up the process of capital punish-
ment." Id. at 11J.
14. Ronald Brownstein, Capital Punishment Held Up as Life or Death Campaign Is-
sue, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1994, at A7. One author reported "the executioner's song [is] a
central theme in political campaigns. . . . [T]he death penalty once again is emerging as a
critical, even dominant, issue in several high-profile campaigns-particularly gubernatorial
elections in some of the largest states." Id. Candidates effectively exploited death penalty
issues in gubernatorial races in Texas, Florida, California, Illinois, and Connecticut. Bob
Minzesheimer, Executioner's Song Heard in Governor Races, USA TODAY, Oct. 27, 1994,
at 9A; see Stephanie Glass, It's Battle Anew on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 7, 1994, at
CN1, CN4 (noting that the gubernatorial candidates for Connecticut all supported the
death penalty). In addition, establishing capital punishment became an issue in Massachu-
setts' gubernatorial campaign. Don Aucoin, Democrats Questioned on Capital Punish-
ment, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 1994, at 33. During a recent Illinois election, Illinois
Governor Jim Edgar advertised his support for capital punishment while emphasizing his
opponent's opposition to the death penalty. Gary Marx, Fear Takes Spotlight in Gover-
nor's Race, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 19, 1994, at Al.
15. The political climate was one factor leading to the Supreme Court's new attitude
toward capital punishment. WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 24 (1991). The rate of
executions increased in traditional death penalty states such as Texas, Florida, and Vir-
ginia, because of Supreme Court rulings. Lori Montgomery, Reacting to Public Outrage,
US. Becoming the Executioner, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 1, 1994, at 10A. As prison officials
estimate that Texas will reach 100 executions in 1996, Ron Dusek of the Texas Attorney
General's Office exclaimed that "[tihe U.S. Supreme Court has cleared up a number of
issues that have allowed executions to go forward." Terrell & Denson, supra note 12, at
A45.
16. See infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text (showing the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of the death penalty in the 1980s).
17. See Sara Wyche Higgins, Note, State v. Jennings: Public Fervor, the North Carolina
Supreme Court, and Society's Ultimate Punishment, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1672, 1673 (1994) (re-
marking on the lack of public concern over the rights of criminal defendants); see also
HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING 23-66, 144-200 (1993) (describing her experiences
as a spiritual advisor to several death row inmates). As of October 1994, there were 2,948
inmates residing on death row in the United States. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDU-
CATIONAL FUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. REPORTER CURRENT SERVICE 689 (1994).
18. Eric D. Scher, Comment, Sawyer v. Whitley: Stretching the Boundaries of a Consti-
tutional Death Penalty, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 237, 257 (1993). Sister Helen Prejean, a well-
known capital punishment opponent, emphasized that "when it comes to deciding whether
someone's going to live or die, we'd better be daggone [sic] sure it's as fair as it can be."
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crucial that the sentencing process be absolutely reliable because a life is
at stake.' 9 A terrible injustice would occur if a jury imposed the death
penalty on someone who did not deserve it.2" However, capital sentenc-
ing reliability means more than preventing an innocent person from re-
ceiving the death penalty."' Reliability also means that, in each
individual case, the death penalty is the appropriate punishment rather
than life imprisonment.22
The Supreme Court has asserted that the death penalty must be im-
posed in a reliable manner to prevent sentencing mistakes.23 Previously,
the Supreme Court had recognized that the severity and finality of the
death penalty make it different from other criminal penalties, such as
Chris Kaltenbach, Sister Helen Crusades Passionately to Stop Capital Punishment, BALT.
SUN, Dec. 9, 1994, at 1E, 5E.
19. Michael J. Crowley, Comment, Jury Coercion in Capital Cases: How Much Risk
Are We Willing to Take?, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1073, 1084 (1989). Special procedural steps
must be taken to ensure that the death penalty is imposed on a non-arbitrary, individual-
ized basis because of its severity. Id.
20. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 22 (1987). Hugo Bedau and Michael Radelet ex-
amined 350 cases of people who were convicted of capital or potentially capital crimes and
who were later found innocent. Id. at 23-24. From first-hand knowledge, Kirk Blood-
sworth recently insisted that "[ilf, say, they executed a thousand guilty people and one
innocent man ... it isn't even close to being worth it." Jenny Allen & Jack Hayes, Stolen
Lives, LiFE, Oct. 1, 1994, at 64, 73. Kirk Bloodsworth recently exited death row with a full
pardon and $300,000 after being convicted twice wrongfully and sentenced to death. Id.
DNA testing not available at his original trial exonerated him. Id. Furthermore, 53 people
have been released from death row because of probable innocence since the death penalty
was restored after Furman. Id. However, some commentators proposed that there is an
acceptable level of error for mistakes in capital sentencing. Stephen J. Markman & Paul
G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L.
REv. 121, 121-22 (1988). Stephen Markham and Paul Cassell responded to the Bedau-
Radelet study of wrongful convictions and disputed its conclusions. Id.
21. See John Kaplan, The Problem of Capital Punishment, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 555,
576 (1983). Professor Kaplan acknowledges that another serious error in capital punish-
ment sentencing occurs when a defendant is executed despite the fact that his crime was
not worse than other similar defendants who did not receive the death penalty. Id.
22. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion); see Cald-
well v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 329 (1984) (emphasizing that many of the constitutional
limits exist because of the need for reliability in capital sentencing); Edward S. West, Com-
ment, The Right of Confrontation and Reliability in Capital Sentencing: Proffitt v. Wain-
wright, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 599, 607 (1983) (describing reliability in the context of death
sentences); cf. Stephen P. Garvey, Death-Innocence and the Law Of Habeas Corpus, 56
ALB. L. REV. 225, 243-44 (1992) (explaining that defendants can have two claims of death-
innocence, including a mistake in his or her eligibility to receive the death sentence and an
error that caused the jury to sentence him or her to death).
23. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329-30. The Caldwell Court recognized that the Eighth
Amendment dictates that the imposition of the death penalty be reliable. Id. at 330; see
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (acknowledging
that the Supreme Court has striven by extraordinary measures to safeguard the defendant
to be sentenced).
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prison sentences or fines.24 Because of this finality, sentencing reliability
must be emphasized to ensure that the death penalty is the appropriate
sentence. 25 To ensure reliability, the Supreme Court has focused on pro-
cedural safeguards to help avoid arbitrary application of the death pen-
alty and to guide the jury during sentencing.26
One safeguard the Supreme Court assumed is that each capital sen-
tencing juror accepts his or her heavy responsibility to decide whether a
defendant shall receive the death penalty.27 The Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that this responsibility acceptance contributes to the reliabil-
ity of the verdict.2 s To satisfy this responsibility requirement, the jury
must feel that it is solely responsible for imposing the death penalty.29
Furthermore, to have a sense of responsibility, the jury cannot make a
death penalty decision knowing that another party bears the ultimate re-
sponsibility for the defendant's fate.3"
24. BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH
PENALTY 29-37 (1987). While discussing the goals of the death penalty, the authors stated
that "[b]oth retribution and deterrence require that the person executed be one who 'de-
served' that punishment." Id.
25. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 363-64 (1977) (White, J., concurring) (quoting
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304-05). Justice White explained that reliable procedures are
needed when a defendant's life is at stake. Id. at 364-65; see NAKELL & HARDY, supra
note 24, at 29-37 (explaining the impact of the "death is different" doctrine).
26. Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2009 (1994); see infra notes 82-139 and
accompanying text (describing the development of the initial post-Furman procedural
protections).
27. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329 (stating "this court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
has taken as a given that capital sentences would view their task as the serious one of
determining whether a specific human being should die at the hands of the State").
28. Id. at 330.
29. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2014 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329-30;
see Ingram v. Zant, 26 F.3d 1047, 1051 (11th Cir. 1994) (denying petitioner's Caldwell claim
because the prosecutor did not minimize the jury's role), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1137
(1995); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 988 F.2d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the prosecutor's
reference to the petitioner's "right to appeal did not indicate to the jury that it was relieved
of its responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the death penalty"), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 1294 (1994); Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 304-06 (3d Cir.) (find-
ing no Caldwell error because the jury knew that the defendant would receive the death
penalty upon their determination so they did not shift their responsibility to the appellate
court), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902 (1991); Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi
Seriously: The Unconstitutionality of Capital Statutes that Divide Sentencing Responsibility
Between Judge and Jury, 30 B.C. L. REV. 283, 297 (1989); see also WILLIAM R. PABST,
JURY MANUAL: A GUIDE FOR PROSPECTIVE JURORS 91, 98 (1st ed. 1985) (noting that the
jurors' responsibility in a criminal trial is great and should be approached very seriously).
30. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-29 (concluding "it is constitutionally impermissible to
rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe
that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests
elsewhere").
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In examining the impact of a jury's "sense of responsibility" on the
reliability of a capital sentencing decision, the Court has overturned a
death sentence because the prosecutor affected the jury's sense of respon-
sibility in making its death penalty decision.31 The prosecutor told the
jurors that they did not have the final decision, rather, the final decision
rested with the appellate court.32 The Supreme Court determined that a
jury needs a sense of responsibility for its decision for the death penalty
sentencing procedure to be constitutional under the Eighth Amend-
ment. 33 The Court left unresolved, however, the meaning and scope of a
jury's sense of responsibility, and also whether, because "death Js differ-
ent," a requirement of reliability in capital sentencing still remained.34 In
Romano v. Oklahoma,35 the Supreme Court addressed whether evidence
a jury received that the defendant had been sentenced to death in an-
other case violated the Eighth Amendment by impermissibly lessening
the jury's sense of responsibility over its decision to impose the death
penalty.36
In Romano, an Oklahoma trial court tried John Romano for the mur-
der-robbery of Roger Sarfaty.37 In a separate previous proceeding, a jury
had found Romano guilty of the murder-robbery of Lloyd Thompson and
had sentenced him to death.38 The Sarfaty jury found Romano guilty,
which required him to face a separate death penalty sentencing hearing.
39
In the sentencing phase of the Sarfaty trial, the jury received evidence
that the Thompson jury had previously sentenced Romano to death.4 °
31. Id. at 341.
32. Id. at 323.
33. Id. at 341; see Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2010 (recognizing situations where affecting
the jury's sense of responsibility could be unconstitutional).
34. See Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2010 (evaluating the petitioner's Caldwell claim). In
fact, in Romano Justice O'Connor concurred solely to explain her earlier controlling posi-
tion in Caldwell. Id. at 2013 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
35. 114 S. Ct. 2004 (1994).
36. Id. at 2008-09.
37. Id. at 2007. A jury found John Romano and an accomplice guilty of murdering
Roger Sarfaty. Romano v. State, 847 P.2d 368, 373 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), aff'd, 114 S.
Ct. 2004 (1994). Romano and his accomplice had beaten, stabbed, and strangled Roger
Sarfaty, a jewelry dealer, while Romano was on a leave pass from the Enid Community
Treatment Center. Id. at 378.
38. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2007. An Oklahoma jury convicted John Romano and
David Woodruff, the same co-defendant from the Sarfaty trial, for the murder of Lloyd
Thompson. Romano v. State, 827 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); Woodruff v.
State, 825 P.2d 273, 273 (Okla Crim. App. 1992). The defendants had stabbed Thompson,
a friend of Romano's, with a knife thirty times. Woodruff, 825 P.2d at 274.
39. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2007.
40. Id. Oklahoma law at that time required the jury to find unanimously at least one
aggravating circumstance, and that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances out-
weighed all the mitigating factors. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.11 (1981)).
1995] 1313
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 44:1307
After the requisite weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors,41 the
Sarfaty jury also imposed the death penalty on Romano.42 Romano, ap-
pealed the decision, asserting that it was improper for the jury to make its
death penalty decision while aware of his prior death sentence.43
On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma affirmed both
the conviction and the sentence of death.44 Regarding the claim of the
jury's lessened sense of responsibility, the appellate court acknowledged
that the disputed evidence could have diminished the jury's sense of re-
sponsibility.45 The appellate court, however, determined that the trial
court properly instructed the jury as to its role, and thus, there was no
reversible error.46 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether a jury's sense of responsibility for imposing the death penalty
was impermissibly undermined by evidence that the capital defendant
had been sentenced to death in another case.4 7
In Romano v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.48 First, the majority opinion
examined the petitioner's claim that the Court's decision in Caldwell v.
Mississippi49 made it unconstitutional to receive a death sentence from a
jury with a lessened sense of responsibility.5" The opinion concluded that
Oklahoma law contains eight statutory aggravating circumstances which the jury could use
to impose the death penalty. Id. (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12 (1981)). At Ro-
mano's penalty trial, the State presented four aggravating factors to the jury. Id. The State
introduced into evidence a copy of the judgment and sentence from the Thompson murder
conviction to prove two of these aggravating factors. Id. The two aggravating factors were
"(1) that petitioner had been previously convicted of a violent felony; and (2) that peti-
tioner would constitute a continuing threat to society." Id. The State also introduced
other evidence from the Thompson trial, such as testimony from a neighbor concerning the
events, Thompson's autopsy report, photographs, and fingerprints. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. The jury found not only that all four aggravating circumstances existed, but
they outweighed the 17 mitigating factors the petitioner presented. Id. at 2008.
43. Id. at 2008. Specifically, Romano contended that the State violated the Eighth
Amendment by diminishing the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the death
penalty. Id.
44. Romano v. State, 847 P.2d 368, 394 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 2004
(1994).
45. Id. at 390.
46. Id.
47. Romano, 114 S. Ct at 2008. The majority explained "we granted certiorari, limited
to the following question: '[D]oes admission of evidence that a capital defendant already
has been sentenced to death in another case impermissibly undermine the sentencing jury's
sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death, in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?' " Id. at 2008-09.
48. Id. at 2012.
49. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
50. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2009-10.
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the Caldwell decision did not cover the petitioner's claim.5 The Court
ruled that the petitioner's claim failed because the evidence did not af-
firmatively mislead the jury regarding its role in the sentencing process.
5 2
In addition, the majority did not agree with the petitioner's general claim
that the evidence rendered his sentencing proceeding unreliable in viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment. 53 Lastly, the Court held that the admis-
sion of the prior sentencing evidence did not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.54
Justice O'Connor concurred, focusing on her Caldwell concurrence,
which the Romano majority adopted as controlling.5 Justice O'Connor
emphasized that for a Caldwell claim56 to be successful "the evidence
must be both inaccurate and tend to undermine the jury's sense of re-
sponsibility."57 Justice O'Connor maintained that Romano's Caldwell
claim failed because the evidence of his prior death sentence was
accurate.58
The dissent argued that the petitioner's claim fell under Caldwell's
principle that a capital jury's lessened sense of responsibility violates the
Eighth Amendment.59 The dissent emphasized that this responsibility re-
51. Id. at 2010. The majority determined that the jury was not affirmatively misled
about its sentencing role so as to minimize its sense of responsibility. Id.
52. Id. The Court maintained that the evidence was not false, and was irrelevant to
the jury's role at sentencing. Id.
53. Id at 2010-11. The Court, however, determined that the Eighth Amendment's
protection of capital defendants does not extend to state evidentiary matters. Id.
54. Id. at 2012. The majority agreed with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
that the petitioner was not deprived of a fair sentencing proceeding by the admission of the
evidence. Id.; see infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of the
petitioner's due process claim).
55. Romano, 114 S. Ct. 2010. The majority recognized that Justice O'Connor provided
the fifth vote in Caldwell and concurred on grounds narrower than the plurality, so her
narrower position was controlling. Id.
56. A Caldwell claim evaluates whether a capital sentencing jury's sense of responsi-
bility has been diminished by a misleading comment. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2010; see
Tafero v. Dugger, 873 F.2d 249, 250 (11th Cir. 1989) (recognizing a Caldwell claim prohib-
its the diminishing of a jury's sense of responsibility in the death penalty sentencing pro-
cess), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); People v. Flores, 606 N.E.2d 1078, 1089 (Il1. 1992)
(explaining that under a Caldwell claim "[t]he critical inquiry is whether the objectionable
comments improperly diminished the jury's sense of responsibility"), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 102 (1993).
57. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2013 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58. Id. The judgment and sentence form revealed that Romano was sentenced to
death for first degree murder. Id. at 2007. Thus, the judgment and sentence form evidence
from the Thompson murder conviction was accurate because Romano was in fact sen-
tenced to death. Id.
59. Id. at 2014 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg authored the dissenting
opinion and concluded that the admission of the judgment and sentence from the Thomp-
son murder diminished the jury's sense of responsibility in violation of Caldwell. Id. Jus-
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quirement evolved in Caldwell because of the need to ensure the reliabil-
ity of capital sentencing procedures. 60 Furthermore, the dissent asserted
that Romano's jury was not reliable because it knew others ultimately
were responsible for imposing his death sentence.61
This Note examines the development of death penalty sentencing prior
to Romano v. Oklahoma and how the Court has tried to ensure reliability
in capital sentencing procedures. This Note then probes the existence of
the requirement of a "jury's sense of responsibility" in ensuring such reli-
ability. Next, this Note argues that death penalty sentencing reliability
dictates that the Supreme Court should have followed Justice Ginsburg's
dissent in Romano. This Note then asserts that Romano effectively elimi-
nates the requirement that a sentencing jury have a "sense of responsibil-
ity" when deciding to impose a death sentence. This Note concludes that
the Romano decision continues to provide the states with an advantage
gained after Caldwell, and this will help tilt death penalty sentencing deci-
sions in favor of imposing a death sentence.
I. DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING LAW BEFORE ROMANO:
PROTECTING THE CAPITAL DEFENDANT BECAUSE "DEATH
IS DIFFERENT"
There is no national policy regarding the death penalty, leaving each
state to enact its own death penalty legislation.62 In fact, prior to 1972,
tice Blackmun wrote separately to reiterate his position that the death penalty is per se
unconstitutional and to support Justice Ginsburg's opinion. Id. at 2013 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
60. Id. at 2014 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent emphasized that the Caldwell
Court reasoned that reliability in capital sentencing was a requirement under the Eighth
Amendment. Id. According to the Romano dissent, Caldwell concluded that the "diminu-
tion of jurors' sense of responsibility violates the Eighth Amendment's reliability require-
ment." Id. at 2016.
61. Id. at 2014.
62. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 126. The authors discussed different
viewpoints of individual states and placed each state in one of five categories: (1) abolition-
ist states; (2) de facto moratorium states; (3) bellwether states; (4) marginal states; and (5)
frequently executing states. Id. at 138-40. The state sentencing statutes are as follows:
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-39 to -59 (1975 & Supp. 1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703
(1989 & Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602 to -605 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995);
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1 - .5 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103
(1986 & Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-45-46a (West 1994 & Supp. 1995);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1987 & Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West
1985 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-30 to -32.1 (1990 & Supp. 1995); IDAHO
CODE § 19-2515 (1987 & Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/9-1 (Smith-Hurd
1993 & Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Bums 1994 & Supp. 1995); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.025-.030 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990 & Supp. 1994); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 905 to -.8 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413 (1992
& Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (1972 & Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT.
1316
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the Supreme Court had yet to decide the constitutionality of the death
penalty.63 However, Furman v. Georgia,' in 1972, extended the Eighth
Amendment's protection against "cruel and unusual" punishment to the
death penalty.65
A. Birth of the "Death is Different" Doctrine
In the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia,66 the Supreme Court de-
§§ 565.030, .032, .035, .040 (Vernon Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-18-301 to -310
(1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-2520, 25 22, 25, 23 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 200.030, .033, .035 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (1986 &
Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1995); N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW § 400.27 (Mc-
Kinney 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-20A-1 to -6 (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000 (1988 & Supp. 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03 to .04 (Anderson 1993 &
Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 701.10 to -.12 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995); OR.
REV. STAT. § 163.150 (1993 & Supp. 1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (1982 & Supp.
1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 23A-27A-1 to -6 (1988 & Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (1991 &
Supp. 1995); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2 to 264.4 (Michie 1995);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 10.95.030 to .100 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-
102 (1988 & Supp. 1995).
63. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-69 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that
1972 was the first time the Court addressed this issue, although not resolving it). Furman
was the first time the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the death penalty
directly. Id. However, prior to Furman, the Supreme Court did hear an argument about
the constitutionality of the death penalty but decided that case on other grounds. Arthur J.
Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 1773, 1775 (1970) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)). One author
grouped the pre-1972 capital decisions of the Supreme Court into three categories. Huoo
ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 248 (3d ed. 1982). One category con-
tained decisions allowing particular methods of execution on "the unargued assumption
that the death penalty itself was not 'cruel and unusual punishment,' [such as] In re Kim-
mler (1890), holding electrocution not to be unconstitutional." Id. The second category
included decisions that dealt with the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The third category contained decisions "in which the Court
settled in favor of the defendant but in a manner that evaded addressing an important
constitutional challenge to the death penalty laws themselves." Id. In addition, before
Furman, the Supreme Court refused to hear a vast number death penalty cases. Id. The
author concluded that in the pre-Furman atmosphere the death penalty seemed immune
from constitutional challenge. Id.; see WELSH S. WHITE, LIFE IN THE BALANCE: PROCE-
DURAL SAFEGUARDS IN CAPITAL CASES 21 (1984) (explaining obstacles that the Furman
litigators had to overcome while attempting to abolish the death penalty).
64. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
65. Id. at 239-40.
66. Prior to Furman, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund orchestrated and maintained a
campaign to attack the death penalty starting in the mid-1960s. Jack Greenberg, Capital
Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 912 (1982). Initially, the Legal Defense Fund
attacked the racial inequality of the death penalty sentence for rape, but soon broadened
into other grounds such as the arbitrariness of its imposition and the exclusion of jurors.
Id.
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clared the prevailing system of capital punishment unconstitutional.67 In
a splintered Court, each majority Justice wrote a separate opinion,68 and
no majority Justice joined another.69 Because of this division, the Court
failed to articulate an understandable, clear rule.7° However, a common
theme7 permeating the opinions recognized that the death penalty stat-
utes were unconstitutional because the sentencing jurors received too
67. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam). The per curiam opinion stated "that the
imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. The Supreme
Court in Furman reviewed the constitutionality of the sentencing statutes of Georgia and
Texas. Id. As a direct result of the Furman decision, 633 death row inmates had their
death sentences commuted. Introduction and Overview, in FACING THE DEATH PENALTY
supra note 1, at 4. Furthermore, Furman invalidated more than 40 state capital sentencing
statutes. See WHITE, supra note 63, at 21.
68. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240 (per curiam). Justice Stewart expressed a now famous
quote when he indicated that "[tihese death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same
way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). Furthermore, he concluded that it was unconstitutional for the legal system to allow
the death penalty "to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." Id. at 310. Justice White
argued "that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the
death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Id. at 313 (White, J.,
concurring). In fact, Justice Douglas, in a footnote, agreed with Justice Stewart and Justice
White regarding arbitrariness and jury discretion. Id. at 248 n.11 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan concluded that the death penalty was unconstitutional per se. Id. at 305
(Brennan, J., concurring). In addition, Justice Brennan reasoned that to comport with
human dignity, the state cannot arbitrarily impose the death penalty. Id. at 274. Justice
Marshall also maintained that the death penalty was unconstitutional per se. Id. at 358-59
(Marshall, J., concurring). Moreover, Justice Marshall strongly condemned capital punish-
ment, reasoning that the imposition of the death penalty is discriminatory against certain
classes, innocent people have been executed, and it has a negative effect on the criminal
justice system. Id. at 364.
69. Id. at 240 (per curiam). The majority agreed on only a brief per curiam opinion.
Id. at 238-39. Each Justice in the majority wrote his own opinion, with no Justice concur-
ring with another. BEDAU, supra note 63, at 254. The Furman Court's multiple opinions
strayed from the traditional opinion format because of its individualistic format and the
"explosion" of words and ideas. Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty
and the Constitution, 85 MicH. L. REV. 1741, 1758 (1987). In fact, the Furman opinion
stretched out over 232 pages. Id.
70. See Ronald J. Mann, The Individualized-Consideration Principle and the Death
Penalty As Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 29 Hous. L. REV. 493, 500 (1992) (explaining
that Furman is best understood by looking at the opinions of Justices Douglas, Stewart,
and White). The Supreme Court had difficulty interpreting Furman as demonstrated by
the failure to have a majority opinion in the initial post-Furman cases, including Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion) and Gregg's companion cases. Mann,
supra at 506-07.
71. See NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 24, at 22. The authors emphasized that the
common theme of the majority Justices was arbitrariness. Id.; see WHITE, supra note 15, at
4, 22-23. Welsh White, a well-known death penalty opponent, concluded that the main
basis of the majority opinions was that the capricious application of capital punishment
violated the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 4.
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much discretion.72 This high level of discretion resulted in arbitrary and
capricious death penalty decisions.73 In essence, the Supreme Court held
that the death penalty sentencing systems were cruel and unusual because
the states used arbitrary and discriminatory methods to select which capi-
tal defendants received the death penalty.74
Furman signaled the beginning of the "death is different" reasoning in
capital sentencing jurisprudence. 75 The Supreme Court reasoned that the
72. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Gregg, the plu-
rality argued that because of the uniqueness and severity of the death penalty, Furman
mandated that sentencing procedures could not create a risk that states would impose the
death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious method. Id. at 188. One author proclaimed:
[1In Furman the Court condemned the system of capital punishment as arbitrary
even though such application of the death penalty was not unmistakably proved.
The Court's conclusion was probably based on two intertwined concerns: First,
the five justices independently reached the judgment that in some sense the death
penalty was in fact being arbitrarily applied-or at least that those who received
death sentences were not sufficiently different from others convicted of capital
crimes to warrant the difference in punishment. Second, the majority was con-
cerned about the appearance of arbitrariness reflected in the lack of clear differ-
entiation between those capital offenders who did and did not receive the death
penalty.
WHITE, supra note 15, at 22-23.
An important part of reliability in sentencing is ensuring that the sentencer, either the
jury or judge, has the appropriate level of discretion to make the death penalty sentencing
decision. See BEDAU, supra note 63, at 12. The proper discretion helps lessen the evil of
arbitrary application of the death penalty. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion).
73. Id.
74. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam). Even before Furman, there was incon-
sistent and different sentencing decisions as a result of the jury having too much discretion.
Lane, supra note 5, at 327-28; see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (plurality opinion) (stating
"Furman held [the death penalty] could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that
created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner").
75. NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 24, at 29-30. Prior to Furman, three Furman Jus-
tices foreshadowed the "death is different" reasoning. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790, 809-10 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Justice
Brennan, in a dissenting and concurring opinion joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall,
argued that the severe nature of the death penalty distinguishes it from most plea bargain-
ing. Id. at 809. Justice Brennan recognized that the Supreme Court has treated death
penalty cases differently from non-death penalty cases. Id. at 809-10. In a capital sentenc-
ing case dealing with the Due Process Clause, Justice Brennan, in a dissenting opinion
joined by Justice Marshall and Justice Douglas, stated:
For we have long recognized that the degree of procedural regularity required by
the Due Process Clause increases with the importance of the interests at stake....
Yet the Court's opinion turns the law on its head to conclude, apparently, that
because a decision to take someone's life is of such tremendous import, those who
make such decisions need not be 'inhibit[ed]' by the safeguards otherwise re-
quired by due process of law.
McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 309 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In addition, one commentator recognized the early pre-Furman development of the
"death is different" philosophy of the Supreme Court in capital cases. See Burt, supra note
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death penalty must be administered differently from other punishments,
such as prison sentences and fines, because of its severity and finality.76
In Furman, three Justices utilized the "death is different" concept.77 Jus-
tice Stewart reasoned that "death is different, 78 and focused on the arbi-
trariness of the death penalty, arguing that death sentences are "wantonly
and so freakishly imposed". 79 Furthermore, both Justice Brennan and
Justice Marshall used the "death is different" concept in their concurring
opinions."s Thus, Furman sowed the seeds of the "death is different"
doctrine, which has been utilized throughout the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment capital sentencing jurisprudence.81
B. "Death is Different" Doctrine Matures in Post-Furman Cases
After Furman invalidated existing capital sentencing statutes, many
state legislatures quickly enacted new statutes to correct the discretion
problem that resulted in arbitrariness. s2 To eradicate arbitrariness, states
either imposed mandatory sentencing or required a weighing of specific
69, at 1743. Robert Burt maintained that after 1932, the death penalty was denoted "an
inevitably 'special circumstance' in constitutional jurisprudence." Id.
76. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (plurality opinion); see
also NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 24, at 30 (describing how the Supreme Court viewed
the death penalty as different from other sentences).
77. See infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (noting that Justices Stewart, Bren-
nan, and Marshall utilized the "death is different" concept).
78. Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart began his con-
curring opinion by professing that "[t]he penalty of death differs from all other forms of
criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability." Id.
79. Id. at 310. Barry Nakell and Kenneth Hardy contended that the Court and others
considered the opinions of Justices Stewart, Douglas, and White to be the law of Furman;
focusing especially on Justice Stewart's opinion. NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 24, at 22.
80. Furman, 408 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan discussed the
uniqueness of the death penalty. Id. He noted briefly how legislators, juries, and the
Supreme Court have dealt with the death penalty. Id. at 286-87. Justice Marshall stated:
"[C]andor compels me to confess that I am not oblivious to the fact that this is
truly a matter of life and death. Not only does it involve the lives of these three
petitioners, but those of the almost 600 other condemned men and women in this
country currently awaiting execution."
Id. at 316 (Marshall, J., concurring). While discussing the deterrent value of the death
sentence, Justice Marshall acknowledged the differences between a death sentence and life
imprisonment. Id. at 346; see NAKELL & HARDY, supra note 24, at 30-31 (discussing Jus-
tice Marshall's opinion).
81. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (showing the Furman Court's em-
phasis on the uniqueness of the death penalty).
82. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 38-39. Twenty states enacted new capital
sentencing legislation a year after Furman. By the second anniversary of Furman, 28 states
had enacted new capital sentencing statutes. Id. at 39.
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aggravating and mitigating factors.8" In 1976,' the Supreme Court in
Gregg v. Georgia85 and four companion cases,86 tackled the questions left
unanswered in Furman: whether the death penalty is per se unconstitu-
tional and whether a death penalty sentencing system could be constitu-
tionally implemented.87 Thus, in Gregg and its companion cases, the
Supreme Court began defining the modem system of capital sentencing.88
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty
was not per se unconstitutional,8 9 and defined procedural parameters that
83. Michael W. Combs, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment: Uncertainty, Am-
biguity, and Judicial Control, 7 S.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1980). Because the Supreme Court failed
to provide sentencing guidance in Furman, the States enacted a variety of statutes while
interpreting Furman. ROGER E. SCHWED, ABOLITION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE
UNITED STATES' JUDICIAL, POLITICAL, AND MORAL BAROMETER 143-44 (1983).
84. No death row inmate had been executed between 1967 and 1977, during which
time the Supreme Court grappled with the constitutionality of the death penalty. Ruthann
Robson & Michael Mello, Ariadne's Provisions: A "Clue of Thread" to the Intricacies of
Procedural Default, Adequate and Independent State Grounds, and Florida's Death Penalty,
76 CAL. L. REV. 87, 95 (1988). Gary Gilmore's execution by firing squad on January 17,
1977 ended 10 years without an execution. Id.; ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 64.
85. 428 U.S 153 (1976).
86. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion) (prohibiting
mandatory death sentences); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (holding mandatory death sentencing statutes unconstitutional); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding Texas' sentencing statute's three ques-
tion inquiry); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion) (allowing Florida's
sentencing statute where the judge is the sentencer).
87. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168 (plurality opinion). The Furman decision did not resolve
whether the death penalty could be constitutional under a different sentencing system. Id.
at 168-69. Justice Stewart explained that until Furman:
[T]he Court never confronted squarely the fundamental claim that the punish-
ment of death always, regardless of the enormity of the offense or the procedure
followed in imposing the sentence, is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Constitution. Although this issue was presented and addressed in Furman, it
was not resolved by the Court.
Id.
88. WHITE, supra note 15, at 5; see Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193-95 (plurality opinion) (con-
cluding that Furman's concerns of arbitrary or capricious sentencing can be met by sen-
tencing statutes that give adequate guidance and information). Justice Stewart recognized
that each state's post-Furman sentencing statute must be examined individually. Id. at 195.
One commentator divided the five 1976 cases into two categories: North Carolina's and
Louisiana's mandatory sentencing statutes; and the "guided-discretion" category with sen-
tencing statutes from Georgia, Florida, and Texas. Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict
in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV.
323, 363-64 (1992). The two mandatory sentencing statutes differed in scope in the catego-
ries of murder to which each applied. Id. at 363. The "guided-discretion" statutes differed
in the level of guidance and discretion the sentencer received. Id. at 364.
89. Justice Stewart's opinion declared that "[wie now hold that the punishment of
death does not invariably violate the Constitution." Id. at 169 (plurality opinion); Howard
Shapiro, Comment, First-Degree Murder Statutes and Capital Sentencing Procedures: An
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death penalty sentencing statutes must follow. 90 The Court required the
minimizing of the arbitrariness by imposing objective guidelines to nar-
row the category of those eligible for the death penalty. 91 In the key
plurality opinion,92 Justice Stewart reasoned that state statutes must min-
imize the arbitrariness of the selection of those sentenced to death.93 The
Supreme Court recognized that these two requirements conflict; minimiz-
ing arbitrariness requires objective guidelines, which in turn interferes
with individualized sentencing.94
In addition, the "death is different" doctrine emerged in both plurality
Analysis and Comparison of Statutory Systems for the Imposition of the Death Penalty in
Georgia, Florida, Texas, and Louisiana, 24 Loy. L. REv. 709, 720 (1978).
90. WHITE, supra note 15, at 5 (explaining that "the Court emphasized the need to
avoid the arbitrary imposition of capital punishment"). The Supreme Court upheld Geor-
gia's sentencing statute. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (plurality opinion). The Georgia legisla-
ture provided for a two-part trial in capital murder cases; one part to determine guilt or
innocence and the next part to determine the punishment. Id. at 163. In the "sentencing
phase" of the trial, the jury must find at least one of 10 statutorily defined aggravating
circumstances present in the crime to impose the death penalty. Id. at 164. In Gregg, the
jury found two aggravating circumstances. Id. at 217-18 (White, J., concurring in judg-
ment). First, the jury found the murder was committed during the commission of two
capital felonies, armed robbery of two people. Id. Second, the jury found the defendant
committed the murder to gain money and valuables. Id. The jury rejected a third aggra-
vating circumstance that the crimes were "outrageously or wantonly vile." Id. at 218.
91. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 (plurality opinion); see Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Capital Punish-
ment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1036-37 (1989) (reviewing the requirements of Georgia's
constitutional statutory scheme).
92. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 600-01 (1978) (plurality opinion). The Supreme
Court in Lockett v. Ohio, two years after Gregg, relied on Justice Stewart's plurality opin-
ion in Gregg. See id. The Lockett Court explained that Gregg and its companion cases
had relied on the plurality opinion of three Justices, Justice Stewart, Justice Powell, and
Justice Stevens. Id. at 601. The Lockett Court reasoned that the three-person concurrence
provided the deciding votes because the remaining six Justices did not form a majority. Id.
Of the remaining Justices, four Justices believed that all five statutes were constitutional
and two Justices believed that all five statutes were unconstitutional. Id.
93. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (plurality opinion). Justice Stewart argued that "Furman
mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action." Id.
94. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). Justice Blackmun detailed the tension between the goal in Furman,
which was consistency and fairness, and the goal in the Lockett decisions, which was indi-
vidual sentencing. Id. at 1133; see also WHITE, supra note 15, at 6. Welsh White explained
that "the two goals articulated in the 1976 decisions are to some degree in conflict. If the
paramount objective is to apply the death penalty even-handedly, the emphasis should be
on providing the sentencing authority with clear objective standards that may be applied
the same way in case after case." Id. Furthermore, he contended that "[i]f the paramount
objective is to promote individualized sentencing, [then] providing clear standards to be
rigorously applied in case after case is impossible." Id.
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opinions.95 Justice Stewart noted that the Supreme Court has been "par-
ticularly sensitive"96 when a defendant faces the death penalty.97 Fur-
thermore, Justice Stewart acknowledged the unique severity and
irrevocability of the death penalty.98 Similarly, in the other plurality
opinion, Justice White joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist, also acknowledged the severity and finality of the death penalty.99
The Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing statutes'0° fell
outside these new parameters and, consequently, were arbitrary and did
not permit particularized consideration of the individual defendant. 10 1 In
Woodson v. North Carolina °2 and Roberts v. Louisiana,103 both the
95. See infra notes 96-99 and accompanying text (describing the emergence of the
death is different doctrine). In fact, Justice Rehnquist (now Chief Justice) acknowledged
the emergence of the "death is different" doctrine while critiquing Justice Stewart's plural-
ity opinion. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 322 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist recog-
nized that the plurality relied "upon the indisputable proposition that 'death is different' "
Id. Justice Rehnquist, however, did not agree that because death is different individualized
sentencing is required. Id. at 322-23.
96. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion). Justice Stewart emphasized that the
Court had been responsive to ensure all safeguards are followed when a person's life is at
stake. Id.; see Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53-55 (1961) (holding that an accused in
a capital case has the right to counsel at arraignment); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1956)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (stating, "[s]o far as capital cases are concerned, I think they stand
on quite a different footing than other offenses. In such cases the law is especially sensitive
to demands for that procedural fairness"); Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 391 (1955)
(asserting that the jury was improperly impaneled because of extraordinary circumstances
which included a life at stake); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 752 (1948) (recogniz-
ing that, when interpreting the United States Code, any ambiguity should be resolved in
favor of the accused); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69-71 (1932) (holding that an ac-
cused in a capital trial requires counsel at every step of the proceedings against him); Diaz
v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912) (observing that defendants in a capital proceed-
ing cannot waive their right to be present at their trial); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam,
In Favorem Mortis: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, HUM. RTs., Winter, 1987,
at 14.
97. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (plurality opinion).
98. Id. (declaring, "[t]here is no question that death as a punishment is unique in its
severity and irrevocability").
99. See id. at 226 (White, J., concurring). Justice White recognized the awesome re-
sponsibility that the death penalty requires for those who participate in its imposition. Id.
100. Mandatory death penalty sentences provided that if the jury convicted a defendant
of a particular crime, such as first-degree murder, then the death penalty was imposed
automatically. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331 (1976) (plurality opinion).
101. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976) (plurality opinion) (con-
cluding that mandatory sentencing violates the Eighth Amendment because it does not
permit an individualized determination); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334-36 (plurality opinion)
(holding that Louisiana's mandatory sentencing statute is unconstitutional because there
are no standards to guide the jury); John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punish-
ment and the Substantive Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punish-
ment, 28 ARIz. L. REV. 143, 229-30 (1986).
102. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
103. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
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North Carolina and Louisiana state legislatures attempted to resolve the
arbitrariness problem by removing all discretion from the jury and impos-
ing mandatory sentences in their new post-Furman death penalty stat-
utes.1°4 However, under both the Louisiana and North Carolina
mandatory sentencing statutes, juries continued to make unguided arbi-
trary sentencing decisions.'1 5 Under mandatory sentencing, the jury had
unfettered discretion because it simply chose to convict the defendant for
the appropriate crime which required the mandatory imposition of the
death penalty. 106 If the jury, however, felt the death penalty was not war-
ranted, it would not convict the defendant for the appropriate crime.107
Thus, the Woodson plurality concluded that mandatory sentencing did
104. Id. at 328-29 (plurality opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286 (plurality opinion). In
Roberts, the Court acknowledged that Louisiana answered Furman by using a mandatory
sentencing statute. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331 (plurality opinion). Furthermore, 10 states
enacted mandatory death penalty statutes in the wake of Furman. Woodson, 428 U.S. at
313 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). One commentator criticized the states that enacted
mandatory sentences, arguing that the legislatures merely sought to restore the death pen-
alty without discussing or examining the death penalty issues. Poulos, supra note 101, at
233.
105. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-03 (plurality opinion) (stating, "it becomes evident
that mandatory statutes enacted in response to Furman have simply papered over the
problem of unguided and unchecked jury discretion"). In Roberts, the Court explained:
This responsive verdict procedure not only lacks standards to guide the jury in
selecting among first-degree murderers, but it plainly invites the jurors to disre-
gard their oaths and choose a verdict for a lesser offense whenever they feel the
death penalty is inappropriate. There is an element of capriciousness in making
the jurors' power to avoid the death penalty dependent on their willingness to
accept this invitation to disregard the trial judge's instructions.
Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334-35 (plurality opinion).
106. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 334. In Louisiana, at the time of Roberts, the death penalty
was mandatory when the jury found the defendant guilty of the newly defined category of
first-degree murder. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (1974)). In a first-degree
murder case, the Louisiana jury had to chose from four categories: guilty, guilty of second-
degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, and not guilty. Id. at 330. In North Carolina, a
first-degree murder charge resulted in a mandatory death sentence. Woodson, 428 U.S. at
285 (plurality opinion). First-degree murder was defined as a murder "perpetrated by
means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of
willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetra-
tion or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or other felony." Id.
107. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293 (plurality opinion). Justice Stewart explained the prob-
lem of jury nullification and the impact on capital sentencing. Id. Jury nullification occurs
when the jury refuses to find the defendant guilty despite overwhelming evidence of guilt.
Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System's Different Voice, 62 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1377, 1399 (1994). In fact, jury nullification has been a problem throughout the early
history of mandatory capital sentencing law. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 292-93; see Robert E.
Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1102,
1130-31 (1953) (explaining the problem of jury nullification in the 1950s); Lynn McCreery
Shaw, Note, "Five to Four Over Spirited Dissent": Justification to Overrule?, 13 Miss. C. L.
REV. 419, 422-23 (1993) (describing the problem of jury nullification because of mandatory
death sentencing).
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not prevent the jury from making arbitrary decisions.'0 8
Furthermore, the Woodson plurality recognized the theme of individu-
ality.'1 9 The opinion maintained that death penalty sentencing required
an individualized inquiry "of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense." 110 The death is
different philosophy became the foundation for requiring an individual-
ized inquiry."' The Court recognized that because of the severe, irrevo-
cable nature of the death penalty, an individualized inquiry was necessary
to ensure that death is the appropriate punishment." 2 Thus, an individu-
alized inquiry ensured the reliability of the imposition of a death
sentence.
13
In Jurek v. Texas,1 14 the Supreme Court elaborated on what could sat-
isfy an individualized inquiry." 5 In evaluating an "individualized" in-
quiry, the Supreme Court was concerned with whether the sentencing
procedures for deciding the death penalty adequately guided the jury's
consideration of the individual offense and the individual offender." 6
The Supreme Court upheld the Texas capital sentencing statute 1 7 be-
cause the statute satisfied the "individualized" inquiry." 8 The statute, in
108. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (holding that the
mandatory death sentence statute enacted by North Carolina violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
109. See id. at 304-05 (introducing the theme of individualized sentencing). In individu-
alized sentencing, the sentencer considers the individual characteristics of the offender and
the offense. Id. at 304. Welsh White emphasized that the Woodson Court introduced the
promotion of individualized sentencing in death penalty proceedings. WHITE, supra note
15, at 5.
110. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion).
111. See id. at 305 (explaining "[t]his conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the
penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment").
112. Id. at 304-05. Justice Stewart utilized an analogy, and stated that the difference
between a death sentence and life imprisonment is greater than the difference between a
100-year prison term and a short prison term. Id. at 305. Justice Stewart recognized that,
because of this difference, the death penalty requires greater reliability. Id.
113. Id. at 304-05.
114. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
115. Id. at 271 (plurality opinion). Justice Stewart explained that a capital sentencing
system that only considers aggravating circumstances does not provide an individualized
determination as required under the Eighth Amendment. Id. The jury must weigh why
the death penalty should not be imposed, as well as why it should be imposed. Id.
116. Id. at 273-74. The Court upheld the statute because it allowed the jury to make an
individualized inquiry and consider the particular circumstances of the defendant and the
offense before making its death penalty decision. Id. at 276.
117. See id. at 269 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC., Art. 37.071 (Supp. 1975-76)).
118. Id. at 276-77. Texas' capital sentencing statute, unlike Georgia's and Florida's stat-
utes, did not require the jury to find an aggravating factor to impose the death penalty. Id.
at 270. The Texas statute required the jury to answer three questions instead of weighing
listed aggravating factors. Id. at 269. The aggravating factors in the Georgia and Florida
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essence, required the jury to consider both aggravating and mitigating
circumstances before it could impose a death sentence. 119 Therefore, the
Texas statute passed constitutional scrutiny because it provided for an
individualized inquiry.
120
Similarly, if the judge is the sentencer, he or she must also perform an
individualized inquiry.121 In Proffitt v. Florida,122 the Supreme Court up-
held Florida's post-Furman death penalty sentencing procedure because
it enabled the sentencing judge to take into account an individualized
inquiry. 123 The Florida sentencing statute instructed the judge to weigh
listed aggravating factors and mitigating factors when deciding to impose
the death penalty.' 24
Thus, in the 1976 cases, the Supreme Court for the first time held that
the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional.'25 Additionally, the
Supreme Court, by developing procedural parameters, addressed what
type of sentencing systems could constitutionally implement the death
penalty. 126 The Court ruled that because death is different, a sentencing
statutes, however, guided the sentencer in imposing the death penalty. See Proffitt v. Flor-
ida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding Florida's statutory system consti-
tutional because the sentencing statute gives the trial judge specific guidance); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that the aggravating and
mitigating factors in the Georgia sentencing statute channels the jury's discretion and pre-
vents the arbitrary application of the death penalty). Justice Stewart asserted that the
Texas statute performed a function similar to the statutes that weighed aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 273-74 (plurality opinion).
119. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 271-73 (plurality opinion).
120. Id. at 276-77.
121. See Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 253 (plurality opinion) (upholding Florida's sentencing
statute, in which the judge is the sentencer, because an individualized inquiry is made).
122. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
123. Id. at 251-52, 259-60 (plurality opinion). In Proffitt, the Court divided into two,
three-person pluralities, both of which held that the Florida statute was constitutional. Id.
at 260-61. Both pluralities agreed that the Florida statute minimized the unlimited discre-
tion and arbitrariness problem. Id. Justice Stewart explained that the trial judge does
focus on the individual character of the defendant and the crime because the statute re-
quires the judge to consider aggravating and mitigating factors. Id. at 251. This prevents
the imposition of the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Id. at 252-53.
124. The trial judge must "weigh the statutory aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances" to determine whether to impose the death penalty. Id. at 250 (discussing FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (Supp. 1976-77)).
125. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion). Justice Stewart,
after discussing Furman, emphasized that "[w]e now hold that the punishment of death
does not invariably violate the Constitution." Id.; see Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 260 (plurality
opinion) (upholding Florida's death penalty statute); Jurek, 428 U.S. at 276 (plurality opin-
ion) (concluding that Texas' death penalty statute did not violate the Eighth Amendment);
Hugo Adam Bedau, Thinking of the Death Penalty as a Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 18
U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 873, 873 (1985).
126. Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 999 (1978); see also HuGo
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statute must minimize arbitrariness and the sentencer must make an indi-
vidualized inquiry to be constitutional. 17 Moreover, the Supreme Court
held mandatory death sentences were unconstitutional because the sen-
tencing statutes did not meet these new parameters.
128
C. Individualized Scrutiny Becomes Focal Point
In 1978, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of an individu-
alized inquiry in a capital sentencing procedure in Lockett v. Ohio. 2 9
The Lockett Court recognized individualized sentencing as the higher pri-
ority between the conflicting requirements of individualized sentencing
and objective standards'
30
In Lockett, a jury found the defendant guilty of murder with aggravat-
ing circumstances for her involvement in a robbery during which the vic-
tim was shot and killed. 3' The trial judge sentenced the defendant to
death 132 and the defendant appealed on several grounds, 33 including that
the Ohio sentencing statute did not allow the sentencer to consider rele-
vant mitigating factors.' 34 A plurality held that the sentencer must con-
ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 174 (1987) (emphasizing that Gregg and its companion cases pro-
vided "models for constitutionally acceptable death penalty systems"); see supra notes 89-
124 and accompanying text (discussing the procedural parameters the Court developed).
127. Supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text (illustrating the requirement of an indi-
vidualized inquiry in capital sentencing).
128. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion); Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (plurality opinion).
129. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). The individualized inquiry is designed to enhance the pros-
pect that the sentencer will consider the individual characteristics of the defendant and the
offense. Mann, supra note 70, at 524-25. Furthermore, the individualized inquiry is not
designed to produce a correct result, rather it is designed to increase the possibility of
discretion on the part of the sentencer. Id.
130. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion) (concluding "that an individualized
decision is essential in capital cases"). Welsh White emphasized that the Lockett decision
appeared to indicate that promoting individualized sentencing was a higher priority over
providing objective guidelines that minimize arbitrariness. WHITE, supra note 15, at 6.
131. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 589-90. The defendant, along with three other individuals,
robbed a pawnshop. Id. The defendant waited outside the pawnshop in the escape car,
because she knew the owner. Id. at 590. A codefendant, while attempting the robbery,
shot and killed the owner. Id.
132. Id. at 594.
133. Id. at 594-97. The Court also addressed the defendant's challenge to the validity
of her conviction. Id. at 594. The defendant challenged the prosecutor's closing remarks
as violative of her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at 594-95. The defendant
claimed that four prospective jurors were dismissed improperly from the venire. Id. at 595.
In addition, the defendant claimed that the Ohio statute violated her fair warning and her
right to due process. Id. at 597. The Court rejected all of these claims. Id. at 594-97.
134. Id at 597 (plurality opinion). The Court considered Lockett's contention that the
Ohio statute did not allow the sentencing judge to consider her individual characteristics as
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sider any mitigating factor the defendant puts forth to refute a death
sentence.' 35 Again, the plurality based its opinion on the principle that
death is different, thereby requiring a death sentence to have a greater
degree of reliability.' 36 The plurality explained that the Eighth Amend-
ment requires the sentencer to consider individual circumstances because
a death sentence is different from a prison sentence. 137 Therefore, the
opinion concluded that the need for "individualized decision is essential
in capital cases.' 138 As a result of Lockett, capital sentencing statutes
cannot prohibit the consideration of any mitigating circumstance that the
defendant puts forth.
139
D. Contemporary Departure from Procedural Protections
These initial post-Furman cases established procedural protections for
defendants sentenced in capital trials because death is different. 140 Com-
mentators, however, have acknowledged that a new phase in capital pun-
ishment jurisprudence began in the early 1980s.' 4' At this time, the
Supreme Court slowly began departing from its emphasis on procedural
mitigating circumstances, such as "her character, prior record, age, lack of specific intent to
cause death, and her relatively minor part in the crime." Id.
135. Id. at 604 (plurality opinion). The plurality concluded:
[T]hat the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all
but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigat-
ing factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death.
Id.
136. Id. at 604-05. The plurality reasoned that death is qualitatively different than
other sentences and, as such, the death sentence requires a greater degree of reliability. Id.
137. See id. at 603-05 (recognizing "[t]he need for treating each defendant in a capital
case with that degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more important
than in noncapital cases").
138. Id. at 605.
139. Id. at 604; Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion
and Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1147, 1160 (1991).
140. Supra notes 109-13, 135-38 and accompanying text; WHITE, supra note 15, at 8.
141. Burt, supra note 69, at 1741-42. Professor Burt divided the Court's constitutional
struggle with capital punishment into three time phases. The first began in 1968 when the
Supreme Court disclosed "doubts about the constitutional validity of the death penalty."
Id. at 1741. The second phase commenced in 1976 when the Supreme Court "attempted to
appease those doubts by rationalizing and routinizing the administration of the [death]
penalty." Id. The last phase began in 1983 when the Supreme Court "signalled its inten-
tion to turn away from any continuing scrutiny of the enterprise." Id.; see Richard E.
Wirick, Comment, Dark Year on Death Row: Guiding Sentencer Discretion After Zant,
Barclay, and Harris, 17 U. C. DAVIS L. REv. 689, 729 (1984) (concluding that the Supreme
Court has deviated from the traditions of Furman, Gregg, and Lockett by not protecting
the defendant).
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protections for capital defendants. 14 2 In Zant v. Stephens,143 the Court
acknowledged the need for greater reliability in capital sentencing be-
cause death is different.'" The Zant Court, however, also recognized
that there could be no perfect procedure for deciding who receives the
death penalty.145 In balancing these two themes, the Zant Court stated
that not every imperfection will overturn a death sentence; but because
death is different it "mandates careful scrutiny in the review of any color-
able claim of error.' 46 Consequently, although the death is different
doctrine still existed, Zant began to erode the doctrine's impact on Eighth
Amendment capital sentencing jurisprudence.1
47
Within this climate diluting procedural protections, the Supreme Court
faced a novel question regarding whether the death penalty can be validly
imposed when a jury believes the responsibility for imposing the death
penalty lies elsewhere. 4 8 Caldwell v. Mississippi 49 gave the Supreme
Court the opportunity to resolve whether the reliability requirement in
death penalty sentencing compels a jury to have a sense of responsibility
for its death penalty decision. 150
In Caldwell, a jury sentenced the defendant to death for robbing and
142. WHITE, supra note 15, at 8-10; Leigh Dingerson, Reclaiming the Gavel: Making
Sense Out of the Death Penalty Debate in State Legislatures, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 873, 873 (1990-91). In fact, the Rehnquist Court continued this trend throughout
the 1980s. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding the death penalty for
16 and 17 year olds); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (upholding the death penalty
for mildly retarded adults); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding that statisti-
cal evidence of racial discrepancy in the implementation of the death penalty does not
indicate arbitrary and capricious sentencing); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986)
(allowing the "death qualification" of a jury prior to the guilt phase of a capital trial);
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (plurality opinion) (upholding the death sentence
where the statute only allowed the defendant's prior record to be used as a mitigating
factor but the sentencer used the defendant's prior record as an aggravating factor).
143. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
144. Id. at 884-85. The Zant Court explained that the severity of the death penalty
requires a higher degree of reliability in ensuring that death is the appropriate sentence.
Id.
145. Id. at 884; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion).
146. Zant, 462 U.S. at 885.
147. See infra notes 263-66 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme
Court's current trend is expediting the death penalty).
148. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 (1985). Writing for the Court, Justice
Marshall explained that "[t]his case presents the issue whether a capital sentence is valid
when the sentencing jury is led to believe that responsibility for determining the appropri-
ateness of a death sentence rests not with the jury but with the appellate court which later
reviews the case." Id. In addition, the Court also examined and rejected a jurisdictional
issue. Id. at 326-327.
149. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
150. Id. at 323.
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killing the owner of a grocery store in Mississippi.151 The defendant ap-
pealed his sentence claiming that the prosecutor's closing remarks vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment because the remarks undermined the jury's
sense of responsibility, therefore, rendering the proceedings unreliable.' 52
In the closing argument, the prosecution had told the jury that responsi-
bility for the final death sentence decision rested with the appellate
court. 153 The Supreme Court concluded that the prosecutor's remarks
violated the Eighth Amendment because they led the sentencing jury to
believe it was not ultimately responsible for imposing the death sentence,
a belief which made the sentencing unreliable. 154 Accordingly, Caldwell
originated the sense of responsibility requirement under the Eighth
Amendment.
155
151. Id. at 324.
152. See id. at 323 (arguing that the prosecutor's statement violated the Eighth Amend-
ment's heightened reliability requirement).
153. Id. at 325. The disputed statement was as follows:
'ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Ladies and gentlemen, I intend to be
brief. I'm in complete disagreement with the approach the defense has taken. I
don't think it's fair. I think the lawyers know better. Now, they would have you
believe that you're going to kill this man and they know-they know that your
decision is not the final decision. My God, how unfair can you be? Your job is
reviewable. They know it. Yet they ...
'COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT: Your honor, I'm going to object to this state-
ment. It's out of order.
'ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Your honor, throughout their argu-
ment, they said this panel was going to kill this man. I think that's terribly unfair.
'THE COURT: Alright, go on and make the full expression so the Jury will not
be confused. I think it proper that the jury realizes that it is reviewable automati-
cally as the death penalty commands. I think that information is now needed by
the Jury so they will not be confused.
'ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY: Throughout their remarks, they have at-
tempted to give you the opposite, sparing the truth. They said 'Thou shalt not
kill.' If that applies to him, it applies to you, insinuating that your decision is the
final decision and that they're gonna take Bobby Caldwell out in front of this
Courthouse in moments and string him up and that is terribly, terribly unfair. For
they know, as I know, and as Judge Baker has told you, that the decision you
render is automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court. Automatically, and I
think it's unfair and I don't mind telling them so.'
Id. at 325-26.
154. Id. at 328-29.
155. See id. at 323 (recognizing for the first time that the jury must have a sense of
responsibility for imposing a death sentence); Mello, supra note 29, at 305. Professor
Mello noted that the Caldwell decision was the first decision to elevate the notion that the
jury cannot believe the determination for imposing the death sentence lies elsewhere. Id.
In addition, Professor Mello argued that a strong common law background required a capi-
tal sentencing jury to have a sense of responsibility toward its sentencing decision and
further claimed that "[t]he Supreme Court in Caldwell recognized for the first time the
eighth amendment dimensions of these concerns." Id at 308. While the jury's sense of
responsibility requirement was officially established in Caldwell, Justice Marshall recog-
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The Caldwell Court156 reasoned that death is qualitatively different' 57
and, as a result, the Supreme Court placed limits on the imposition of the
death penalty.15 1 The foundation of these limits rests upon the assurance
that the death sentence is reliable and appropriate. 159 The Supreme
Court recognized that the reliability of a death sentence depends upon
the jury taking its role seriously. 6 ° Therefore, the Caldwell Court ruled
that the prosecutor's suggestion that the sentencing jury could shift the
ultimate decisionmaking responsibility to an appellate court interfered
with the jury's role by detracting from its responsibility, rendering its sen-
tence unreliable and in violation of the Eighth Amendment.' 6
1
Justice Marshall, who wrote the majority opinion, articulated four spe-
cific reasons why the death sentence would be unreliable when the jury
shifts its sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of
the death sentence to an appellate court.' 62 First, jurors do not under-
nized the potential existence of this requirement two years earlier in his dissent in Califor-
nia v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1017 n.3 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156. Although, technically a plurality opinion due to Justice O'Connor's concurrence,
the Supreme Court and state supreme courts have treated Caldwell as a majority opinion.
Mello, supra note 29, at 291-92 n.44. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens
composed the plurality. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 322. Justice O'Connor provided the fifth
vote, in a narrower concurring opinion. Id. at 341-43 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
in judgment). Justice O'Connor joined the Court in all but Part IV-A of Justice Marshall's
opinion. Id. at 341-42. The dissent consisted of Justices Rehnquist, White, and Chief Jus-
tice Burger. Id. at 343 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Powell took no part in the deci-
sion. Id.
157. Id. at 329. The Caldwell Court emphasized that under the Supreme Court's
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence the severity of the death penalty warrants a higher de-
gree of scrutiny for the imposition of the death penalty. Id. It then explained that many of
the Supreme Court's limits on capital punishment "are rooted in a concern that the sen-
tencing process should facilitate the responsible and reliable exercise of sentencing discre-
tion." Id.
158. Id. at 328-29 (concluding that it is unconstitutional to allow a sentencer to render a
death sentence with a lessened sense of responsibility).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 329-30. The Court reasoned that jurors who take their responsibility seri-
ously allow sentencer discretion to contribute to the reliability of the sentence. Id. at 330.
The Court asserted that:
Belief in the truth of the assumption that sentencers treat their power to deter-
mine the appropriateness of death as an 'awesome responsibility' has allowed this
Court to view sentencer discretion as consistent with-and indeed indispensable
to-the Eighth Amendment's 'need for reliability in the determination that death
is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.'
Id. at 330 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality
opinion)).
161. Id. at 330.
162. Id. at 330-33. The Court explained that the death penalty sentencing proceeding
becomes unreliable and biased when the state makes suggestions that the sentencing jury
can shift its sense of responsibility to an appellate court. Id. at 330.
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stand the role of an appellate court and this results in bias against the
defendant.' 63 Justice Marshall argued that this lack of understanding
prejudices the defendant because an appellate court cannot confront the
defendant and, therefore, is unsuited to determine the death penalty.
164
In such a situation the defendant may well forfeit any consideration of
those " 'compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties of humankind.' ,165 Furthermore, an appellate court also uses a
presumption of correctness when reviewing a death penalty sentence.166
Second, a juror's inclination to impose the death penalty to send a
message that it seriously disapproves of the crime may increase if he or
she knows that its decision is not final.167 Third, the jurors know that a
death sentence, unlike a life sentence, gives them the opportunity to shift
sentencing responsibility to someone else because of the death penalty
appellate process.1 68 Finally, Justice Marshall argued that, given the se-
verity of the death penalty, an individual juror may find it highly attrac-
tive to minimize the importance of his or her role. 169 As a result, a juror
reluctant to impose the death penalty nevertheless may give in and im-
pose it, if he or she thinks the appellate court will make the final
decision.
1 70
Justice Marshall rejected the argument that each state should decide
the degree to which a capital sentencing jury should know of post-sen-
tencing proceedings. 171 The Supreme Court dealt with this issue in Cali-
163. Id. at 330.
164. Id. (declaring that the absence of confrontation between the appellate court and
the defendant may eviscerate the defendant's constitutional right to consideration of miti-
gating factors).
165. Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
166. Id. at 331. The Court explained that appellate courts review criminal sentences
with a "presumption of correctness." Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 332. A life sentence is not necessarily reviewable, and therefore, is not
shifted to someone else. See id.
169. Id. at 332-33. The Court explained that jurors are placed in an unfamiliar situation
while having to make a very troublesome choice. Id. at 333. In addition, the jurors have
substantial discretion and are given little guidance on how to exercise it. Id. As a result,
the Court argued that in this type of environment, the danger becomes too great that the
jury would minimize its role when given the suggestion that the responsibility for imposing
the death penalty lies elsewhere. Id.
170. Id. at 333.
171. Id. at 335. The two arguments rejected by five Justices were: (1) that the defense
counsel's argument invited the prosecutor's comments, id. at 336-37; and (2) that under
Donnelly v. DeChrisotoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974), the comments by the state prosecutor
should not be considered violative of federal constitutional rights, Caldwell, 472 U.S. at
337-40. Justice Marshall rejected the argument that California v. Ramos covered the pros-
ecutor's statements. Id. at 335-36.
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fornia v. Ramos. 72  In Ramos, the Court had considered the
constitutionality of a California statute that required the court to instruct
the jury that the Governor could pardon a defendant sentenced to life
without parole. 173 In Caldwell, Justice Marshall reasoned that the Cali-
fornia statute in Ramos dealt with a jury instruction that "was both accu-
rate and relevant to a legitimate state penological interest.' ' 174 The
legitimate state interest was the possibility of the defendant's future dan-
gerousness if he ever re-enters society.'75 Justice Marshall contrasted this
concern with the prosecutor's remarks in Caldwell and concluded that the
remarks were neither accurate nor relevant to a valid state penological
interest.
76
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that the capital jury
can receive accurate and misleading instructions regarding post-sentenc-
ing procedures. 77 In addition, Justice O'Connor recognized affirmatively
172. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
173. Id. at 995. The instruction was called a "Briggs Instruction." Id. at 995 n.4. The
instruction given at the penalty trial was as follows:
'You are instructed that under the State Constitution a Governor is empowered
to grant a reprieve, pardon, or commutation of a sentence following conviction of
a crime.
Under this power a Governor may in the future commute or modify a sentence
of life imprisonment without possibility of parole to a lesser sentence that would
include the possibility of parole.'
Id. at 995-96.
174. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 335. Justice Marshall explained that Ramos addressed Cali-
fornia's statutory requirement that jurors be notified that the governor can commute a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole into a lesser sentence. Id. While upholding
the California statute, Justice Marshall determined that the instruction was pertinent to the
valid state penological interest of minimizing the future dangerousness of the defendant.
Id.
Furthermore, Justice Marshall authored the dissenting opinion in Ramos. 463 U.S. at
1015 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's dissent observed that the Court should
have framed the issue as "whether the Briggs Instruction [was] misleading" and not
whether to allow a balanced instruction-meaning the judge also instructs the jury that a
death sentence can be commuted. Id. at 1016-17. In addition, Justice Marshall stated that
the Briggs Instruction was unconstitutional because it was speculative, thus creating an
arbitrary and capricious decision, id. at 1020-21, and that the Briggs Instruction introduced
an impermissible factor in the death penalty decision, id. at 1021. Finally, Justice Marshall
observed that the instruction allowed the jury to believe it could foreclose future clemency
relief by electing to use the death penalty. Id. at 1024-25.
175. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 335; see also Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1005. The Ramos Court
reasoned that having the jury focus attention on future dangerousness does not hinder the
required individualized inquiry. Id.
176. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 336. Justice Marshall explained that the prosecutor's state-
ment about the appellate court's review process was misleading and portrayed the jury's
role as incompatible with the capital sentencer's role. Id.
177. Id. at 342 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in judgment). In Ramos, however,
Justice O'Connor implied the requirement that a jury have a sense of responsibility in
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the need for a jury's sense of responsibility for making the death penalty
decision.17  The Caldwell Court, however, never resolved what defines a
jury's sense of responsibility and how much responsibility is needed to
ensure reliability of the death sentence. 79
Subsequently, post-Caldwell cases did not elaborate on the precise pa-
rameters of Caldwell.'8° In Darden v. Wainwright,'8' the Darden major-
ity stated, in a footnote, that CaIdwell only concerned comments that
mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process by allowing the
jury to feel less responsible for its sentencing decision. 82 However, the
scope of an affected juror's responsibility remained unclear, other than
including a reduced role in the sentencing process. 83 Thus, Darden did
capital sentencing procedures. See Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1006-08 (discussing the respon-
dent's contention that the Briggs Instruction "undermines the jury's responsibility to make
an individualized sentencing determination"). Furthermore, in Ramos, Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, id. at 998-99, and Justice Marshall, writing in dissent, id. at 1018
(Marshall, J., dissenting), both acknowledged the severity of a death sentence. Justice
O'Connor stated "[tihe Court, as well as the separate opinions of a majority of the individ-
ual Justices, has recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other punish-
ments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing
determination." Id. at 998-99. In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that he "had thought
it was common ground that the capital sentencing process must be as reliable, as rational,
and as free of mistakes as is humanly possible." Id. at 1018 (Marshall, J., dissenting). One
commentator contended that Justice O'Connor's Caldwell concurrence demonstrated her
focus on the responsibility of the sentencer rather than on the rights of the defendant.
Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA.
L. REV. 543, 610 (1986). Moreover, Justice O'Connor's analysis focused on the effect of
the prosecutor's remarks on the jury's action, rather than on the probable effect on the
defendant. Id. at 611.
178. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 342 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in judgment). Jus-
tice O'Connor reported that the prosecutor's remarks were both inaccurate and misleading
in a fashion that minimized the jury's sense of responsibility. Id. Therefore, the prosecu-
tor's remarks were impermissible. Id.
179. See id. at 328-30.
180. See infra notes 181-86 and accompanying text (explaining how post-Caldwell cases
did not clarify a "jury's sense of responsibility" for imposing the death penalty).
181. 477 U.S. 168 (1986). In Darden, a five-to-four decision, a Florida prisoner sen-
tenced to death appealed his conviction and sentence by arguing that a juror was improp-
erly excluded, the prosecutor's closing argument was improper, and he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 170.
182. Id. at 183-84 n.15. The majority claimed that "Caldwell is relevant only to certain
types of comment-those that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a
way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision."
Id. at 184 n.15.
183. See id. at 184 n.15 (explaining that the prosecutor's comments would have actually
increased the jury's perception regarding its role in the sentencing process).
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not define the limits of Caldwell."8 Prior to Romano v. Oklahoma,85
the jury responsibility issue existed, but the direction of its resolution re-
mained uncertain.1
86
II. ROMANO V. OKLAHOMA: JURY'S SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY
REQUIREMENT VANISHES
In Romano v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
termine whether evidence that a defendant in a capital sentencing hear-
ing had been sentenced to death in another case, unconstitutionally
undermines the sentencing jury's sense of responsibility in determining
the appropriateness of the death penalty.187 In a five-to-four decision,
the Court affirmed the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals by holding
that a jury's knowledge that the defendant has a prior death sentence
does not impermissibly undermine its sense of responsibility. 188 The ma-
jority explained that, because the evidence did not affirmatively mislead
the jury with regard to its role in the capital sentencing process, 89 the
184. Id. In fact, the Darden majority distinguished Caldwell by contending that the
comments were made at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, and that the trial judge did
not endorse the comments. Id.
185. 114 S. Ct. 2004 (1994).
186. After Caldwell, the Supreme Court declined to review cases that dealt with
prosecutorial argument that minimized the jurors' sense of responsibility for their verdict.
Lipham v. Georgia, 488 U.S. 873 (1988) (denying certiorari); Nicks v. Alabama, 487 U.S.
1241 (1988) (same). In Lipham v. Georgia, the prosecutor sought to minimize the jury's
sense of responsibility by claiming that he had a part in choosing the death penalty because
he brought the charges and then declared that the jury should not "feel like [the decision]
is yours and have it weigh too heavily on you because that was my decision." Lipham, 488
U.S. at 874 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial or certiorari). Justice Marshall argued that
"[tihe prosecutor's statement here-admonishing the jurors not to 'feel like it is you[r]
[decision]' and urging them not to 'have it weigh too heavily on you because that was my
decision'-is designed for only one reason: to dissipate the jury's sense of personal respon-
sibility for this most awesome of decisions." Id. at 875.
In Nicks v. Alabama, the prosecutor asserted that the jury's decision was an advisory
opinion and that the judge was the final sentencer. 487 U.S. at 1242 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari). Again, Justice Marshall contented that prosecutor's argu-
ment violated Caldwell. Id. Justice Marshall argued that the prosecutor's argument
shifted the "jury's sense of responsibility to another decisionmaker" which in turn, affects
the reliability of the sentencer's verdict. Id.
187. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2008-09.
188. Id. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals denied Romano's claim and decided that
although the evidence was irrelevant, a jury instruction corrected any shift in responsibility
or consideration that its decision was less significant. Romano v. State, 847 P.2d 368, 390-
91 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993), aff'd, 114 S. Ct. 2004 (1994). In addition, the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals rejected a claim of denial of due process. Id. at 391.
189. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2010. Romano claimed the jury's sense of responsibility was
unconstitutionally undermined for determining the appropriateness of the death penalty.
Id. at 2007. He argued that admitting the prior murder trial's judgment and sentence form
into evidence allowed the jury to be aware that he was already sentenced to death. Id.
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jury's awareness of the petitioner's prior death sentence did not negate its
sense of responsibility in choosing the death penalty. 9 '
The Romano Court's decision clarified and narrowed the parameters
Caldwell v.Mississippi 9' set forth regarding a jury's sense of responsibil-
ity for determining the death penalty.' 92 The majority confined Caldwell
claims to very limited circumstances. 93 After Romano, a Caldwell claim
does not exist for all situations in which a jury's sense of responsibility for
imposing the death penalty is minimized.' 94 Rather, a defendant can ef-
fectively assert a Caldwell claim only when untruthful information affects
the jury's sense of responsibility regarding its role in the sentencing
process.
195
A. The Majority Opinion: The Demise of the Jury's Sense of
Responsibility Requirement
The majority addressed whether a capital jury's sense of responsibility
for implementing the death penalty is impermissibly undermined by its
knowledge that the defendant already has been sentenced to death.
96
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began by reviewing the
Court's role in determining the constitutionality of capital sentencing
under the Eighth Amendment. 97 The majority explained that the
Supreme Court historically has been concerned with the process by which
states choose which defendants receive the death penalty and not with
substantive information placed before the sentencer.
198
The majority opinion asserted that the states must perform two tasks
under the Eighth Amendment to impose the death penalty constitution-
ally.19 9 First, the state must establish criteria that narrow the sentencer's
190. Id. at 2010. The majority reasoned that the judgment and sentence form was accu-
rate and did not pertain to the jury's role in the sentencing process. Id.
191. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
192. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2010. The majority asserted that Caldwell is relevant for
those comments "that mislead the jury as to its role in the sentencing process in a way that
allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision." Id.
(quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 184 n.15 (1986)).
193. See infra notes 254-57 and accompanying text (explaining how the Romano Court
narrowed Caldwell).
194. Id.
195. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2010.
196. Id. at 2008-09.
197. Id. at 2009. Chief Justice Rehnquist began his analysis with an overview of how
the state capital sentencing statutes must ensure that the death sentence is appropriate.
Id.; see infra notes 199-201 and accompanying text (explaining what the Eighth Amend-
ment requires the state capital sentencing statutes to accomplish).
198. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2009 (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983)).
199. Id. (explaining that the Constitution allows for "traditional latitude" in state sen-
tencing statutes to establish evidentiary rules at sentencing proceedings).
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discretion over the determination that a particular defendant should re-
ceive the death penalty as compared to others similarly convicted of mur-
der.2"' Next, the majority explained that the state must ensure that the
sentencer makes an individualized inquiry into the defendant's character,
record and the circumstances of the offense.2"' After setting forth an
overview of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the
majority evaluated the petitioner's claim.20 2
The majority examined the petitioner's argument under three different
rationales: whether the petitioner could make a Caldwell claim; whether
the petitioner could establish a general Eighth Amendment claim; and
whether the petitioner could claim a due process violation.20 3 The major-
ity rejected the petitioner's Caldwell claim2 4 by interpreting Caldwell
narrowly in holding that a jury loses its sense of responsibility only when
it is affirmatively misled as to its role by inaccurate or untruthful informa-
tion.20 5 Therefore, the majority reasoned that, according to the facts, Ro-
mano's jury was not given inaccurate information because he was in fact
previously sentenced to death.20 6 Furthermore, the majority asserted
that the evidence of Romano's prior death sentence did not pertain to the
jury's role in the sentencing process.20 7
Next, the majority rejected the petitioner's claim that the introduction
of inaccurate and irrelevant evidence rendered the sentencing proceeding
so unreliable that it violated the Eighth Amendment.20 8 The Romano
Court reasoned that no constitutional error occurred if the admitted evi-
dence is irrelevant as a matter of state law.209 Moreover, the majority
characterized the petitioner's claim as an invitation to establish federal
200. Id.
201. See id. (mandating a minimum threshold beneath which the death penalty could
not be imposed).
202. Id. Furthermore, the majority maintained that the states cannot limit any consid-
eration of mitigating circumstances. Id.
203. Id. at 2010-13.
204. Id. at 2010-12. Besides the Caldwell claim, Romano argued that evidence of his
prior capital conviction rendered his death sentence unreliable and as such, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 2010. In addition, Romano asserted that the introduction
of his prior death sentence violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 2012.
205. Id. at 2010.
206. Id. The majority argued that "[t]he infirmity identified in Caldwell is simply ab-
sent in this case: Here, the jury was not affirmatively misled regarding its role in the sen-
tencing process. The evidence at issue was neither false at the time it was admitted, nor did
it even pertain to the jury's role in the sentencing process." Id.
207. The judgment and sentence form indicated that Romano was found guilty and
sentenced to death for the murder of Lloyd Thompson. Id. at 2007.
208. Id. at 2010.
209. Id. at 2010-11. The Court opined that evidence that is irrelevant under state law
does not automatically violate the Constitution if admitted. Id. at 2011.
1995] 1337
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evidentiary rules for state death penalty sentencing proceedings. 210 The
majority stressed that the Supreme Court would not fashion general evi-
dentiary rules for capital sentencing proceedings while interpreting the
Eighth Amendment.211 As long as the state sentencing statutes fell
within the constitutional limits, then the state was free to prescribe its
own evidentiary rules for sentencing proceedings.212
Lastly, the majority found that the introduction of Romano's prior
death sentence did not violate his right to due process.213 The majority
examined whether the admission of Romano's prior death sentence "so
infected the sentencing proceeding as to violate due process. '214 The ma-
jority found no violation because the trial judge had instructed the jury
properly, and because other relevant evidence existed that justified the
death sentence.21 5
B. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion: Closing the Door on
Caldwell Claims
Justice O'Connor concurred with the majority opinion, writing to focus
on why the petitioner's Caldwell claim failed.216 Justice O'Connor de-
clared that a successful Caldwell claim "must be both inaccurate and tend
to undermine the jury's sense of responsibility. '217 She reiterated her po-
sition in Caldwell that it was the inaccuracy of the prosecutor's argument
to the jury that made it unconstitutional. 218 Justice O'Connor reasoned
that the accuracy of the information presented to the jury is critical, not
the effect such information has on the jury's sense of responsibility.
219
Therefore, Justice O'Connor found no Caldwell violation because the
jury heard accurate information-that Romano in fact was sentenced to
210. Id. at 2011.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2012-13.
214. Id. at 2012. The majority considered whether the evidence of Romano's prior
death sentence injected such unfairness into the sentencing proceeding "as to render the
jury's imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process." Id.
215. Id. The Court presumed that the jury followed the trial court's instructions. Id.
The majority argued that the trial instructions properly portrayed the jurors' important
role in determining Romano's sentence. Id. Furthermore, the majority contended that the
existence of three aggravating factors was sufficient for the jury to sentence Romano to
death. Id.
216. Id. at 2013 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor wrote separately to em-
phasize her interpretation of Caldwell. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. Justice O'Connor maintained that it was not unconstitutional for accurate in-
formation to minimize a jury's sense of responsibility. Id.
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death in the first trial.22 °
C. The Dissent: The Eighth Amendment Requires a Capital Jury to
Maintain a Sense of Responsibility
Justice Ginsburg authored the dissenting opinion and presented a dif-
ferent, broader version of the Caldwell principle.221 The dissent argued
that a successful Caldwell claim occurred whenever a capital sentencer
believed the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the de-
fendant's death sentence lay elsewhere. 222 The dissent reasoned that
Caldwell held that a jury's lessened sense of responsibility unconstitution-
ally affected the reliability of the capital sentencing procedure. 223 Ac-
cordingly, the dissent focused on whether the jury's sense of
responsibility actually was minimized and, consequently, affected the reli-
ability of the death sentence.224
As a result, the dissent maintained that the knowledge of Romano's
prior death sentence resulted in the jury having a diminished sense of
responsibility.225 The dissent reasoned that jurors who already know that
the defendant will die for another crime would place less significance on
their decision and would be relieved of their separate sense of responsi-
bility.226 The dissent maintained that a juror inclined to hold out for a
different sentence may acquiesce in imposing the death sentence because
that juror knows the defendant previously has been sentenced to
death. 227 Furthermore, the dissent contended that an uncertain juror
may be swayed to vote for the death sentence because a previous jury
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2013-14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg was joined in dissent by
Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens, and Justice Souter. Id.
222. Id. at 2015.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2015-16. In fact, Justice Ginsburg emphasized several examples from Cald-
well of how a juror with a lessened sense of responsibility could affect the reliability of the
sentence. Id. Moreover, Justice Ginsburg argued that a holdout juror who does not be-
lieve the death penalty should be imposed could acquiesce in a death penalty verdict be-
cause the juror knows the final verdict is not the jury's responsibility. Id.
225. See id. at 2014. The majority, on the other hand, focused on whether the jury
received accurate information. Id. at 2010. For example, in Caldwell, Justice O'Connor
emphasized that the prosecutor's statement to the jury concerning appellate review was
inaccurate. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 342 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in judgment).
The prosecutor indicated that the jury was not responsible for making the final decision of
whether the defendant will receive the death penalty, because the appellate court would
make the final determination. Id. at 342-43. The prosecutor's information was inaccurate
because in Mississippi there is a presumption of correctness for the jury's decision; there-
fore, the Mississippi appellate courts do not make the final decision. Id. at 343.
226. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2015 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 2015-16.
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already has done so.22 Lastly, the dissent argued that a jury panel that
knows they are not responsible for the final determination of the death
penalty may vote for the death sentence to send a message of disapproval
for the defendant's conduct.
229
Next, the dissent disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Justice
O'Connor's position in Caldwell.2 3' The dissent recognized that Justice
O'Connor's concurring position in Caldwell provided the fifth vote for
certain sections of the opinion.231 The dissent contended that Justice
O'Connor, in her Caldwell concurrence, limited her disagreement to in-
formation presented to the sentencer regarding post-sentencing re-
view.232 Thus, the dissent reasoned that because Romano's claim was not
about post-sentencing procedures, it did not fall under Justice
O'Connor's narrowed view of Caldwell.
233
The dissent next rejected the majority's contention that post-Caldwell
cases confirmed a narrow view of Caldwell.234 The dissent observed that
in Darden v. Wainwright,235 the disputed comments were not in evidence
and did not occur in the sentencing phase.236 Furthermore, the dissent
asserted that Sawyer v. Smith237 was concerned with whether the Cald-
well decision could be applied retroactively. 238 The dissent argued that
the Sawyer Court did not consider whether a Caldwell violation oc-
curred.239 Moreover, the dissent maintained that in Dugger v. Adams,240
the Court acknowledged that the petitioner's Caldwell claim was irrele-
228. Id. at 2015.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 2016-18 (arguing that the majority interpreted Justice O'Connor's posi-
tion in Caldwell incorrectly).
231. See id. at 2017.
232. Id. The dissent argued that Justice O'Connor disagreed with only a three-para-
graph section of the opinion, Part IV-A. Id. Because Justice O'Connor only disagreed
with Section IV-A, the dissent contended that the rest of the Caldwell opinion actually
received five votes. See id.
233. Id.
234. Id. The majority cited favorably Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990); Dugger v.
Adams, 489 U.S. 401 (1989); and Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) to support its
definition of a Caldwell claim. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2010.
235. 477 U.S. 168 (1986).
236. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2017 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
237. 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
238. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2017-18 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 2017 n.5. In fact, the Sawyer Court stated it did not need to address the
merits of the Caldwell claim, and would address only whether the petitioner could bring a
Caldwell claim in a habeas corpus action. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 229, 234. Therefore, the
Sawyer Court never directly addressed the merits of the petitioner's Caldwell claim. See
id.
240. 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
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vant to deciding the case.24'
After rejecting the post-Caldwell cases, the dissent pointed out the in-
adequacy of the trial judge's instructions in correcting the jury's dimin-
ished sense of responsibility.24 The dissent claimed that once the jury's
sense of responsibility erodes, the trial court's instructions are inadequate
to correct the situation.2 43 Lastly, Justice Blackmun, in a separate dis-
sent, wrote to emphasize his view that the death penalty cannot be im-
posed fairly within the constraints of the Constitution.2 " Justice
Blackmun also reasoned that the admission of Romano's prior death sen-
tence was unconstitutional, like the prosecutor's statements in Cald-
well,245 because of the unacceptable risk of jurors minimizing the
importance of their roles.
246
III. JURY SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND RELIABILITY IN DEATH
PENALTY SENTENCING
In death penalty sentencing, a jury is required to have a sense of re-
sponsibility, meaning that the jury must feel responsible for making the
death penalty decision.247 The jury cannot believe the decision for impos-
ing the death penalty lies elsewhere.24 s Caldwell established and Ro-
241. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2017 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Adams, 489 U.S.
at 408 n.4. In Adams, the certiorari petition did not allege that the jury was misinformed,
and the Supreme Court contended that the Caldwell claim was irrelevant to the disposition
of the case. Id.
242. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2018 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the
information of Romano's prior death sentence was part of the evidence presented to the
jury, and the trial judge instructed the jury to consider all the evidence in making its deci-
sion. Id.; see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 137 (1968) (demonstrating that limiting
instructions will not always correct trial defects).
243. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2018 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 2013 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun argued to "vacate Ro-
mano's death sentence and remand for resentencing in adherence to [the] view that the
death penalty cannot be imposed fairly within the constraints of our Constitution." Id. In
1994, Justice Blackmun announced that according to his view the death penalty could not
be imposed fairly. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1138 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). Since that point, Justice Blackmun argues against the imposition
of the death penalty in each applicable case. See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 114 S. Ct.
2630, 2641 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing against the imposition of the death
penalty); see Allan Gates, It's Been a Great Ride: A Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun,
43 AM. U. L. REv. 717, 719 (1994) (describing Justice Blackmun's change of views on the
death penalty).
245. See supra note 153 (listing the prosecutor's remarks).
246. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2013 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
247. See id. at 2009-10 (recognizing that a juror's sense of responsibility for its capital
sentencing decision cannot be affected in certain circumstances).
248. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985). In fact, the Court concluded
that it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose the death sentence if the sentencer be-
lieves that the responsibility for determining the death penalty rests elsewhere. Id. In
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mano affirmed that a jury must have some sense of responsibility for its
death penalty sentencing decision.249 The significant question is not
whether the requirement exists after Romano, but rather, what is the
scope of this requirement post-Romano?
A. Demise of the Jury's Sense of Responsibility Requirement
In Romano, the major issue the Court faced was whether a capital de-
fendant deserved to be sentenced by a jury that had a lessened sense of
responsibility 250 for its decision.251' The Court could have utilized Ro-
mano as a vehicle to establish the principle that juries are required to
have an unaltered sense of responsibility for making the difficult death
penalty decision.252 However, the majority rejected an expansive inter-
pretation of Caldwell and instead limited Caldwell claims to situations in
which the jury is affirmatively misled.253
The Romano Court narrowed the Eighth Amendment claim of a jury's
lessened sense of responsibility because it refused to include every situa-
tion when a capital jury actually has a diminished responsibility for its
sentencing decision within such claim. 254 Thus, there will be situations in
which the jury does in fact have a diminished sense of responsibility for
imposing the death penalty, but a defendant will not be able to claim an
Eighth Amendment violation.255 As a result, Romano eliminated many
legitimate claims that could be brought but for the fact that the informa-
tion presented to the jury was accurate.256 Therefore, in situations where
Romano, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion recognized that in some instances a
jury cannot feel less responsible for its sentencing decision. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2009-10.
249. See supra notes 196-215 and accompanying text.
250. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-29. A jury's sense of responsibility becomes dimin-
ished when the jury believes another party is responsible for the determination of imposing
the death penalty. See id. (stating a sentencing decision made by a sentencer who believes
that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the death penalty lies else-
where is impermissible).
251. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2008-09.
252. See id. at 2014 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg in her dissenting opin-
ion emphasized that the Caldwell principle of not allowing a capital sentencing jury to
believe the determination for a death sentence lies with someone else does in fact cover
Romano's case. Id.
253. Id. at 2010. The Romano Court held that a jury must be "affirmatively misled...
regarding its role in the sentencing process so as to diminish its sense of responsibility" to
contravene the Caldwell principle. Id.
254. See id. (limiting the Caldwell claims to only those occasions when the jury is af-
firmatively misled).
255. See id. (disallowing a claim that the jury has a diminished sense of responsibility
because the jury was not affirmatively misled).
256. See id. Justice Ginsburg in her Romano dissent discusses how the jury's sense of
responsibility is affected whenever there is a violation of the Caldwell principle. Id. at
2015-16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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accurate information lessens the jury's sense of responsibility, the only
protection available to a defendant is the Due Process Clause.257
The Romano majority narrowed Caldwell for several reasons.258 First,
the majority did not want the Court to intrude into decisions the states
should make.2 59 Therefore, the majority refused to develop federal rules
of evidence applicable to state court capital-sentencing proceedings. 6 °
257. See id. at 2012 (applying the Due Process Clause to the review of a sentencing
phase of a death penalty trial); see also Linda E. Carter, A Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Standard in Death Penalty Proceedings: A Neglected Element of Fairness, 52 OHIO ST. L.J.
195, 202-03 (1991) (illustrating that the Due Process Clause is an independent inquiry dur-
ing the penalty phase of capital trials). It should be noted, however, that the due process
inquiry failed to help Romano, and, as such, will be unlikely to help future defendants who
claim the jury's sense of responsibility was minimized. See Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2012-13.
For the majority, however, at a minimum there is protection against fundamental unfair-
ness by the Due Process Clause, so it was not necessary to extend Caldwell in further
regulating the state's sentencing proceedings. See id. at 2012 (stating" '[t]he Caldwell rule
was ... added to [Donnelly's] existing guarantee of due process protection against funda-
mental unfairness' ") (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 244 (1990)). The test for a
due process violation in a capital sentencing proceeding is whether the evidence "so in-
fected the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury's imposition of the
death penalty a denial of due process." Id.; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642-
43 (1974); see Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
168, 181 (1986).
258. See Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2009-10.
259. Id. at 2009; see BEDAU, supra note 63, at 19 (discussing judicial deference to the
legislature regarding the types of punishment that attach to offenses).
One possible reason for the deference is that the Court is returning the mechanics of the
capital sentencing process to the states. Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 67, 131 (1992). In Coleman v. Balkcom, Justice Stevens recognized
that imposing the death penalty is a state interest. 451 U.S. 949, 950 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari). Jim York, Florida Deputy Attorney General, recog-
nized that the capital sentencing system can thwart legitimate state court judgments be-
cause capital cases remain in the system so long. Tom Gibbons, Victims Again: Survivors
Suffer Through Capital Appeals, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1988, at 64, 66.
One concern of a centralized government power in capital sentencing, is that the federal
government would be burdened with the responsibility of ensuring the accuracy of the
death sentencing convictions. Eric M. Freedman, Innocence, Federalism, and the Capital
Jury: Two Legislative Proposals for Evaluating Post-Trial Evidence of Innocence in Death
Penalty Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 315, 319-20 (1990-91). This centraliza-
tion would not best protect individual liberty. Id. at 320. In addition, one problem of
federalism is that it "is often ill-defined and unevenly applied." Robson & Mello, supra
note 84, at 91.
260. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2011. The majority had an underlying concern against de-
veloping an independent Eighth Amendment analysis to cover evidence at capital sentenc-
ing proceedings. Id Chief Justice Rehnquist contended strongly that "[w]e have not done
so in the past, however, and we will not do so today. The Eighth Amendment does not
establish a federal code of evidence to supersede state evidentiary rules in capital sentenc-
ing proceedings." Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged, however, that the Due Pro-
cess Clause applies to capital sentencing proceedings. Id. at 2012.
In his dissenting opinion in Caldwell, then-Justice Rehnquist also alluded to his reluc-
tance to develop an independent Eighth Amendment analysis for capital sentencing pro-
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The Romano Court reasoned that under the Eighth Amendment the
Court has imposed procedural limits on the states for death penalty sen-
tencing.261 Thus, the majority approached Romano's issue as strictly a
substantive problem that the states are entitled to decide.262
In addition, the Romano majority followed the current trend of expe-
diting the death penalty process and not emphasizing the individual de-
fendant's protection.2 63  The Court departed from the individualized
sentencing requirement emphasized in the Lockett era.264 One reason for
ceedings. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 350 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In
fact, as early as Woodson, he argued that the states should receive deference in drafting
their capital sentencing statutes. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 313 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing in favor of the state legislative decisions); Alan I. Bigel,
William H. Rehnquist on Capital Punishment, 17 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 729, 746-47 (1991).
Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not stray from the viewpoint that the states should
have wide discretion. See Bigel, supra, at 752-53.
In addition, Justice Scalia acknowledged that problems of a "Federal Rules of Death
Penalty Evidence" include problems with predictability of justice and piecemeal develop-
ment. Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2205 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). One
commentator, however, advocates developing a uniform system that each state would fol-
low regarding innocence claims in deaih penalty cases. See Freedman, supra note 259, at
322. Another commentator recognized the Supreme Court's willingness to tolerate irregu-
larities in death penalty cases because of federalism. Franklin E. Zimring, Inheriting the
Wind The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment in the 1990s, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7,
14 (1992).
261. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2009 (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983)).
262. See id. at 2011 (disallowing the claim because the Court will not fashion eviden-
tiary rules).
263. Justice Blackmun, while dissenting from a denial of certiorari four months before
Romano, complained about the Supreme Court's lack of judicial oversight. Callins v. Col-
lins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1138 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Jus-
tice Blackmun argued that numerous procedural barriers keep the federal judiciary from
reviewing the constitutional claims of capital defendants. Id. Justice Blackmun cited mul-
tiple cases in support of his position. Id. (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993);
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991),
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)). One commentator noted the Supreme Court's " 'hang 'em
high' philosophy" as recent decisions "indicate a willingness to execute just about anyone
unfortunate enough to wind up on death row, including the mentally retarded." Charles R.
Morse, Recent Development, Habeas Corpus and "Actual Innocence": Herrera v. Collins,
113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 848, 849 (1993) (citations omitted); see
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991) (allowing the use of "victim-impact" state-
ments in sentencing trials when previously victim-impact statements were per se unconsti-
tutional because an individualized determination required looking at the defendant's
character and the characteristics of the crime). Furthermore, the Rehnquist Court has
continued to build procedural barriers to the assertion of constitutional errors presented in
federal habeas actions. Timothy J. Foley, The New Arbitrariness: Procedural Default of
Federal Habeas Corpus Claims in Capital Cases, 23 Lov. L.A. L. REV. 193, 195 (1989).
264. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 818 (1991). The Court declared that
other factors having some bearing on the defendant's guilt and his personal responsibility
may be considered in addition to the defendant's character and aspects of the crime. Id.
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this trend can be attributed to the immense pressure both federal and
state courts are experiencing to expedite the death penalty process.2 65
Consequently, defendants have less avenues available for successful
appeals.2 66
The Supreme Court has, in effect, created a difficult wall for defendants
to surmount when challenging their death penalty verdicts beyond the
trial level.2 67 The Romano Court closed an avenue for making a Caldwell
claim because of federalism concerns and the current trend of eliminating
protections of capital defendants.2 68 As a result, the Eighth Amendment
is unlikely to protect a capital defendant when sentenced by a jury with a
lessened sense of responsibility.2 69
B. The Expansive Approach Advocated by the Dissent is Preferred
The proper approach to Caldwell claims dictates that the courts find an
Eighth Amendment violation anytime the jury believed the responsibility
for imposing the death penalty rested elsewhere.27 ° Otherwise, if a sen-
tencing jury lacked a sense of responsibility the defendant's death sen-
tence will not be reliable.27 1 Furthermore, the sentencing proceeding
One commentator argued that the Supreme Court has curtailed the impact of its earlier
decisions and "even... reverse[d] [its] earlier 'death-is-different' rulings." Richard J. Bon-
nie, Preserving Justice in Capital Cases While Streamlining the Process of Collateral Review,
23 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 103 (1991). Another commentator predicted the collapse of the
"Gregg system" of eliminating arbitrariness because of the conservative majority on the
Supreme Court. Gey, supra note 259, at 89.
265. Foley, supra note 263, at 211. Virginia Attorney General James S. Gilmore re-
cently introduced legislation to accelerate the death penalty process. Virginia Death Pen-
alty Appeals, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 1995, at B7. The legislation even proposed to cut off
funding to the Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center, which supplies legal serv-
ices for death row inmates. Id. With respect to the death penalty being carried out, a
University of Iowa law professor contended that " '[t]he pressure is on for governors,
judges, everyone to speed things up a lot.'" Tony Mauro & Mark Potok, Death Penalty
Becoming "Real", USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 1994, at 3A (quoting David Baldus).
266. See Christopher E. Smith & Avis Alexandria Jones, The Rehnquist Court's Activ-
ism and the Risk of Injustice, 26 CONN. L. REV. 53, 64-66 (1993) (explaining how the Rehn-
quist Court, through its denial to habeas corpus petitions, restricted access to federal
courts).
267. William S. Geimer, Law and Reality in the Capital Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 273, 278 (1990-91).
268. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 114 S. Ct. 2004, 2011-12 (1994).
269. See Welsh S. White, Prosecutors' Closing Arguments at the Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SoC. CHANGE 297, 306 (1990-91). Professor Welsh White argued that "im-
proper prosecutorial arguments which do not violate Caldwell generally will not result in
reversal of a defendant's death sentence unless the defendant can show that the argument
poses some special danger to his constitutional rights." Id.
270. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2013-14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
271. See infra notes 280-84 and accompanying text (explaining why the imposition of a
death sentence would be unreliable).
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would be balanced in favor of a death determination.272
1. A Diminished Sense of Responsibility Makes a Jury's Death
Sentence Unreliable
Under traditional Eighth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court
provided a defendant facing the death penalty special considerations be-
cause death is different.273 One such consideration was the emphasis that
the imposition of the death sentence be reliable. Both the Supreme
Court and commentators have acknowledged that, under the Eighth
Amendment, death penalty sentencing proceedings must be reliable.274
Thus, reliability is significant because the Court developed the reliability
doctrine to ensure the constitutional imposition of the death penalty
under the Eighth Amendment.275
In Romano, the dissent recognized the reliability requirement in evalu-
ating the scope of what violates a capital jury's sense of responsibility. 276
On the other hand, the majority failed to consider that the irrevocable,
final nature of the death penalty demands a greater degree of reliabil-
272. See infra notes 287-97 (illustrating how a capital sentencing proceeding would be
balanced in favor of a death determination).
273. See supra notes 109-13, 136-38. As the Supreme Court pointed out, death is final
and unique in that there is no rehabilitation and no opportunity for courts to correct mis-
takes in sentencing once the sentence has been carried out. Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion). Justice Stewart concluded that death is differ-
ent from imprisonment and, as such, requires greater reliability. Id.; see also Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (finding that the death penalty
is unique); Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 341 (vacating sentence because of the lack of reliability).
274. Justice Ginsburg emphasized that the need for reliability is the reason the diminu-
tion of the jury's responsibility violates the Eighth Amendment. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at
2016 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg argued that Caldwell reasoned that the
Eighth Amendment's reliability requirement is violated by a diminished jury's sense of
responsibility. Id. The Caldwell Court reasoned that many capital sentencing limits are
based on a concern that the imposition of the death penalty be reliable. Caldwell, 472 U.S.
at 329. The Caldwell opinion cited many decisions that reflected and supported this view-
point. Id.; see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982) (finding that the
Oklahoma statute violated the Eighth Amendment by not allowing the defendant to intro-
duce mitigating factors); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605-07 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(finding the Ohio statute impermissibly prohibited evidence of certain mitigating factors);
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302-04 (plurality opinion) (holding that a mandatory death penalty
statute violated the Eighth Amendment); Mello, supra note 29, at 304 (noting that "a capi-
tal sentencing scheme must meet the eighth amendment's need for heightened reliability in
the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case"); Jordan
Steiker, The Long Road Up from Barbarism: Thurgood Marshall and the Death Penalty, 71
TEX. L. REV. 1131, 1138 (1993) (suggesting that the Court recognized a principle of height-
ened reliability); see also William W. Hood, III, Note, The Meaning of "Life" for Virginia
Jfurors and its Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1610-11
(1989) (discussing the reliability requirement).
275. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2015; Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329.
276. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2013-14.
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ity.277 Sentencing reliability is highly significant because Caldwell, based
its holding on the assurance that the reliability requirement of the Eighth
Amendment was followed.278 Furthermore, in Romano, by evading the
reliability requirement, the majority avoided questions about the detri-
mental practical effect of a jury's minimized sense of responsibility for its
sentencing decision.279
A jury with a diminished sense of responsibility cannot make a fair and
reliable determination to impose the death penalty.280 The dissent illus-
277. See id. at 2008-10.
278. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 341. In addition, it is important to note that Justice
O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, disagreed with the part of the majority's opinion that
dealt with the interpretation of California v. Ramos and whether a jury has to be affirma-
tively misled regarding its role so as to diminish its responsibility. Id. at 341-43 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and in judgment). This point is significant because sections in the
opinion contending that Eighth Amendment death penalty jurisprudence requires reliabil-
ity is, in fact, joined by five justices. See id. at 323-34 (stating that Justice Marshall was
delivering the opinion for the Court, except for one part).
In Caldwell, Justice Marshall's opinion pointed out that "many of the limits that this
Court has placed on the imposition of capital punishment are rooted in a concern that the
sentencing process should facilitate the responsible and reliable exercise of sentencing dis-
cretion." Id. at 329. Justice Marshall linked the reliability requirement to the jury's sense
of responsibility by first establishing that the courts have recognized that jurors treat their
responsibility to determine the life or death of the defendant as an "awesome responsibil-
ity". Id. at 329-30. Next, the belief that jurors in fact recognize their awesome responsibil-
ity allows the courts to view their capital sentencing decisions as consistent with the Eighth
Amendment reliability need. Id. at 330. Therefore, when the jurors' beliefs in their re-
sponsibility are affected in some way, the reliability of their sentencing decision is affected.
See id.
279. Chief Justice Rehnquist established a patterned unwillingness to examine the
"modes of carrying out capital statutes not in violation of any constitutional provision."
Bigel, supra note 260, at 753. In fact, then-Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Caldwell, did
not agree that the Eighth Amendment required procedures that ensured the death sen-
tence is the correct sentencing decision. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 349-51 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). While evaluating the Eighth Amendment argument in Caldwell, he argued that
the emphasis that the Eighth Amendment demands reliability was merely dicta. Id at 350.
Contrast this approach with Caldwell. In Caldwell, using reliability as a basis, the Court
provided four examples of how a jury's sense of responsibility could be affected in the
determination of imposing the death penalty. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330-33. Likewise, Jus-
tice Ginsburg, dissenting in Romano, used examples of how the jury's lessened sense of
responsibility could have affected their decision to impose the death penalty because the
jury knew Romano already was sentenced to death. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2015-16 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting).
280. In Caldwell, Justice Marshall gave four specific reasons of how a jury with a dimin-
ished sense of responsibility could produce an unreliable death penalty decision. Caldwell,
472 U.S. at 330-33. First, the appellate court is limited in what it may review and cannot
confront and examine the defendant individually. Id. at 330. Second, Justice Marshall
acknowledged that a jury may "wish to 'send a message' of extreme disapproval for the
defendant's acts." Id. at 331. Here, if the jury wanted to send a message, the defendant
would be sentenced to death, but its decision was not based on whether death was the
appropriate sentence. Id. at 331-32. Third, if the jury knows that the life sentence will be
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trated examples of how a jury's death penalty decision would be ad-
versely affected if the jury believed the death penalty decision lies
elsewhere.281 The dissent argued that a jury knowing in advance that an-
other jury had imposed the death penalty might be inclined to send a
message and mete out the harshest sentence-the death penalty.282 Fur-
thermore, the dissent observed that a juror who normally would holdout
for a life sentence would be inclined to give in and vote for the death
penalty.283 In addition, empirical studies suggest responsibility does in-
fluence decision-making.2"l Under the Eighth Amendment, the impact
of the jury's sense of responsibility on the reliability of a capital sentence
should be considered. 285 The dissent's position protected the defendant
not be appealed, but the death sentence would be then the jury may chose to vote for the
death sentence. Id. at 332. Lastly, because of the unfamiliar situation and difficult choice
of making a death sentence determination, it is highly attractive for jurors to believe that
the sense of responsibility for this difficult choice lies elsewhere. Id. at 332-33. Justice
Marshall emphasized that it is easy to imagine that a divided jury could be persuaded by
the presence of appellate review to impose the death penalty. Id. at 333.
In addition, the dissent in Romano offered examples of how a jury with a diminished
sense of responsibility is impacted. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2015 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg cited several state cases that declared a jury may be swayed by the knowl-
edge that " 'another jury had previously resolved the identical issue adversely to defend-
ant.'" Id. (quoting People v. Hope, 508 N.E.2d 202, 206 (I11. 1986)). The Romano dissent
also acknowledged two arguments Justice Marshall put forth in Caldwell, that of sending a
message and reluctant jurors giving in when they believe that the appellate court is the
actual decision-maker. Id. at 2015-16.
281. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2015-16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
282. Id.
283. Id. One author reported that efforts are made to persuade a holdout juror to
change his or her vote. REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 232 (1983). The persuaders
pay little attention to relevant case material, rather, extralegal issues are used to convince
the holdout. Id.
284. Mello, supra note 29, at 321-22. Professor Michael Mello contends that "[t]wo
studies support the conclusion that responsibility indeed influences decisionmaking" and
affects deliberations. Id. These studies, however, are not uncontradicted. A different
study indicates responsibility for the decision does not play a significant role. Id. at 324.
Professor Michael Mello explains the impact of this study saying "[w]here the situation is a
high stress one, however, like a capital sentencing decision, this experimental jury data
gathered under distinctly different conditions of reality and gravity may be inapplicable."
Id. The Supreme Court, however, has shown an aversion toward the use of social studies
that demonstrate serious flaws in capital sentencing decisions. William S. Geimer &
Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida
Death Penalty Cases, 15 Am. J. CRIM. L. 1, 4 (1987-88). Furthermore, the Supreme Court
may be skeptical and cautious in dealing with empirical data. See Paul S. Appelbaum, The
Empirical Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 335, 346-
47 (1987).
285. A juror's sense of responsibility should be considered because "[]uries... tend to
shrink from the hard decision of sentencing a man to death." Roger Lowenstein, Do Ju-
rors Shirk Their Duty?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1986, at Al (quoting Ed Austin, Jacksonville,
Fla. state attorney).
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by ensuring a more reliable sentencing proceeding.286
2. The Scales Are Unfairly Tipped in Favor of a Death Sentence
A presumption in favor of death can handicap a defendant facing a
death penalty sentencing hearing.287 Furthermore, a defendant sen-
tenced by a jury with a lessened sense of responsibility has the scales
unfairly tilted in favor of a death sentence. 288 A defendant cannot cor-
rect this imbalance because of his or her inability to make a successful
286. The majority failed to protect the defendant from the negative impact of a jury
with a diminished sense of responsibility and the unreliability of the verdict. See Romano,
114 S. Ct. at 2015-16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). One death penalty lawyer, Sara Determan,
exclaimed "[a]ny system which sacrifices the rights of persons who may be put to death at
the altar of speed for speed's sake is not a system of justice." Gibbons, supra note 259, at
64-65 (quoting Sara-Ann Determan, Chairman, ABA's Post-conviction Death Penalty
Representation Project).
287. One study of Florida death penalty sentencing trials recognized that a significant
number of jurors studied presumed that the death penalty was mandatory unless the de-
fendant could persuade otherwise. Geimar & Amsterdam, supra note 284, at 40-42, 44-46.
One juror, who was a member of a jury that sentenced a defendant to death, claimed the
jury had no option but to vote for death. Id. at 45. The juror further stated: "Of course he
got death. That's what we were there for." Id. at 46. Moreover, one commentator recog-
nized that the "playing field" in death penalty sentencing cases is not level. See James E.
Coleman, Jr., Litigating at the Speed Of Light: Postconviction Proceedings Under a Death
Warrant, LITIG., Summer 1990, at 14. An argument has been made that in the reality of a
capital sentencing proceeding, the defendant bears the burden of proving life, and further-
more, has both the burden of production and of persuasion. Geimer, supra note 267, at
287; cf AMY SINGER & PAT MALONEY, TRIALS AND DELIBERATIONS: INSIDE THE JURY
ROOM 230 (1992) (maintaining that in drug cases the burden of proof is actually on the
defendant, and that the jurors wrestle with their own gut reactions and eventually forget
the law).
Furthermore, poverty is an additional handicap for a capital defendant. See Richard
Cohen, Sentenced to Die Because He Is Poor, WASH. POST, May 19, 1992, at A19 (stating,
"[tihe aggravating circumstance that most contributes to the death penalty is what it has
always been: poverty") Id. Richard Cohen reasoned that Roger Coleman was sentenced
to die because he could not afford a rich man's lawyer who may have succeeded in mitigat-
ing his sentence. Id. In addition, Maryland State Senator Decatur W. Trotter acknowl-
edged that "[t]here's no question that the death penalty weighs heavily on the poor, the
disadvantaged and black. This is acknowledged in every report that we read." Sheridan
Lyons, Death Row Cases Raise Questions of Bias, BALT. SUN, June 5, 1994, at B1.
Furthermore, Richard Burr, the litigation director for the federally financed Texas Re-
source Center, which handles appeals of capital cases, contended that the system of ap-
pointing counsel contributed to the imposition of the death penalty because court-
appointed counsel is often inadequate. Texas County in Forefront in Executions, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1994, at 31. Furthermore, the economic advantage of the government may
thwart a fair jury trial. PABST, supra note 29, at 99.
288. See Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2015-16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (listing the ways a
jury's diminished sense of responsibility could affect the sentencing in a death penalty deci-
sion); see also Stephen P. Garvey, Note, Politicizing Who Dies, 101 YALE L.J. 187, 187
(1991) (finding that the responsibility for deciding whether to impose capital punishment is
fragmented). The current system of capital sentencing encourages those at the front end,
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Caldwell claim.289
Moreover, Romano allows the prosecutor to present irrelevant infor-
mation to the jury which could affect its sense of responsibility.29 ° While
prosecutors may attempt to utilize every possible advantage, allowing
them to affect a jury's sense of responsibility should not be tolerated. 91
In Romano, the dissent illustrated that the problem of prosecutors un-
juries and prosecutors, to reassure themselves that others will correct their mistakes, yet
the appellate courts are disinclined to change those decisions. Id.
289. See Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2009-10 (limiting a Caldwell claim to only cases that
present inaccurate information that misleads the jury regarding its role). Furthermore,
with a Caldwell claim, the defendant receives no relief because a trial court's instructions
to the jury cannot correct a Caldwell error. Id. at 2018 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see DON-
ALD E. VINSON, JURY PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGIES & TRIAL TECHNIQUES
72 (1993) (arguing that jurors have trouble following instructions when asked to disregard
or ignore certain evidence); see also JONATHAN D. CASPER & KENNETTE M. BENEDICT,
INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 66 (Reid Hastie ed.,
1993) (arguing that scientific research suggests that a judge's instructions are incapable of
blocking out extralegal information in a juror's decisions); Arthur S. Hayes, Jurors' Grasp
of Instructions May Stir Appeal, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1992, at B1 (reporting that a study
found as much as 75% of 238 jurors interviewed, in Cook County, Illinois, misunderstood
parts of the judge's death penalty instructions).
290. See Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2017 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In Romano, the prose-
cutor used the Thompson murder judgment and sentence report to show one of the statu-
torily defined aggravating factors, a conviction of a prior violent felony. Id. at 2007.
Justice Ginsburg recognized that the prosecutor in Romano did not have to present the
judgment and sentence report because Romano was willing to stipulate his prior conviction
for murder. Id. at 2016 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This helps to illuminate a valid concern
about the zealousness of prosecutors in presenting evidence to the jury.
291. See David E. Overby, Comment, Improper Prosecutorial Argument in Capital
Cases, 58 UMKC L. REV. 651, 655-56 (1990) (recognizing that a prosecutor's statement
that minimizes the jury's sense of responsibility is universally recognized as improper);
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNC-
TION § 3-5.8(d) (3d ed. 1993) (stating "[t]he prosecutor should refrain from argument
which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence").
The capital jury's role is important because, historically, the capital jury's authority has
been "integrally connected to its basic role of safeguarding a criminal defendant from gov-
ernment oppression." Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope of a
Capital Defendant's Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 30 (1989). Some pros-
ecutors, however, endeavor to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility by highlighting
the role of others in the death penalty process. Steiker, supra note 274, at 1154. The
widespread adoption of mandatory appellate review makes it easier for the prosecutor to
"deflect 'ultimate' responsibility for a death verdict to the appellate courts." Id.
As an example of prosecutorial misconduct, in a recent case, an accused defendant
brought a civil suit for damages against prosecutors for allegedly fabricating evidence in a
highly publicized rape and murder trial. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2610
(1993). In Buckley, the defendant accused the prosecutors of fabricating evidence because
three independent studies failed to match the defendants boots and with the bootprints
found so they brought in another expert "who was allegedly well known for her willingness
to fabricate unreliable expert testimony." Id.
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fairly influencing the jury is a legitimate concern. 2 92 The Romano prose-
cutor refused to accept the defendant's stipulation and wanted the jury to
know the petitioner was going to die for a previous crime.293 The jury did
not need to know the petitioner received the death penalty because the
defendant's stipulation would have shown the aggravating factor the
prosecutor was trying to prove.294
Thus, a jury's lessened sense of responsibility grants the prosecutor an
advantage and tilts the defendant's sentence toward the imposition of the
death penalty.295 The unfair advantage occurs because a jury's lessened
sense of responsibility impacts the likelihood that the jury will impose the
death penalty.296 This advantage nullifies the idea that capital sentencing
proceedings are supposed to be extra reliable. 297 The dissent's position
would ensure a more fair, reliable process by which capital defendants
are sentenced.298 Under the dissent's approach, the Eighth Amendment
would protect the defendant whenever the jury's sense of responsibility is
diminished.299
3. The Bedrock Crumbles: The Demise of the Death is Different
Doctrine
Historically, the principles of the death is different doctrine has guided
292. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2016 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Stephen Bright, Director of
the Southern Center for Human Rights, argued that "[djeath penalty laws are drawn so
broadly almost any serious murder case is eligible for the death penalty, and prosecutors
are vested with vast and totally unreviewable discretion." Texas County in Forefront in
Executions, supra note 287, at 31.
293. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2016 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In her dissent, Justice Gins-
burg argued that Romano's prosecutor must have believed that apprising the jury of the
prior death sentence would propel them toward a death determination, otherwise, the
prosecutor would have accepted the defense stipulation of the underlying conviction. Id.
294. Id.
295. See id. at 2013-14 (arguing that the prosecutor's comments "infected the jury's life-
or-death deliberations").
296. A Wall Street Journal article reported that "[i]n a Miami drug-murder case, one
juror says the panel rejected the death penalty because some jurors 'didn't want to take the
responsibility.' " Lowenstein, supra note 285, at Al.
297. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 (1983) (recognizing the need for reliability
because of the severe, final nature of the death penalty).
298. This is evident by examining the bare facts in Romano. 114 S. Ct. at 2007-08. The
prosecutor presented irrelevant, prejudicial evidence to a jury that had to determine
whether the defendant would live or die and the Supreme Court allowed it. Id. at 2011-12.
Two authors contend that the such extralegal information would influence the jurors' deci-
sions. See CASPER & BENEDICT, supra note 289, at 66. In addition, the information would
have such an impact on the jurors that a judge's instructions to disregard the extralegal
information would be ineffective. See id.
299. Romano, 114 S. Ct. at 2014 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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the evaluation of the death penalty.30 ° The death is different doctrine
protected the capital defendant by demanding sentencing reliability.3 '
The Court, however, has begun to reverse the impact of earlier death is
different rulings.30 2 In fact, in Romano, the Supreme Court failed to even
acknowledge the severity of the death penalty and the higher scrutiny
death penalty appeals should receive. 30 3 The Supreme Court continues
to weaken the death is different doctrine by failing to adhere to the re-
quirement of higher scrutiny and the emphasis on reliability.
IV. CONCLUSION
After Romano v. Oklahoma, no workable sense of responsibility re-
quirement exists under the Eighth Amendment for capital defendants.
The Romano Court deviated from the death is different doctrine which
previously ensured capital sentencing reliability. As a result, the Romano
Court has unfairly tipped the scales against a defendant facing the death
penalty. The Court has continued its trend in failing to provide the capi-
tal defendant with adequate protection by granting the States too much
discretion in capital sentencing proceedings. In future capital appeals,
the Court should emphasize the reliability of the sentence.
Kevin Michael Miller
300. Steven Paul Smith, Note, Unreliable and Prejudicial: The Use of Extraneous
Unadjudicated Offenses in the Penalty Phases of Capital Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1249,
1252-53 (1993). The Supreme Court's insistence on reliability resulted from the death is
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